Limiting free speech to protect religion : the future for blasphemy and religious hate speech laws in New Zealand by Clarke, Brendon, 1984-
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
(597 
2007 
BRENDON CLARKE 
LIMITING FREE SPEECH TO PROTECT 
RELIGION: THE FUTURE FOR BLASPHEMY 
AND RELIGIOUS HATE SPEECH LAWS IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
SUBMITTED FOR THE LLB (HONOURS) DEGREE 
FACULTY OF LAW 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
2007 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 4 
II MODERN LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS FOR RELIGION. .................. 6 
III THE CRIME OF BLASPHEMY .................................................... 8 
A Historical Development ................................................................ 8 
B The Crime of Blasphemy Today: Whitehouse v Lemon ........................ 9 
C The Satanic Verses ........................................................... ........ 10 
D A Justifiable Limitation on Free Speech? Decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights ................................................................. 11 
IV THE FUTURE OF BLASPHEMY: ANALYSING THE 
ARGUMENTS ....................................................................... 16 
A Arguments For the Retention of Blasphemy ....................................... 16 
1 The protection of religious sensibilities ...................................................... 16 
2 The protection of society ................................................................................ 17 
3 The protection of individual feelings ............................................................. 18 
4 The protection of public order ....................................................................... 19 
B Arguments Against the Retention of Blasphemy ............................... 20 
1 Uncertainty and strict liability .................................................... 20 
2 Restriction to the Church of England ............................................. 22 
3 Impossibility of securing a conviction today .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... 24 
V THE WAY FORWARD ............................................................ 27 
VI RELIGIOUS HATE SPEECH ................................................... 28 
A The Rationale/or Prohibiting HateSpeech ..................................... 28 
B The Existing Framework in New Zealand ...................................... 30 
Vll THE DANGERS OF PROHIBITING RELIGIOUS HATE SPEECH ..... 32 
A Race and Religion are Different in Kind ........................................ 32 
B The Victorian Exa111ple ............................................................. 35 
2 
VIII THE PATH TO THE RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS HATRED 
ACT 2006 (UK) ....................................................................... 38 
A The Increasing Threat to the Muslim Community ............................ 39 
B Closing a Loophole .................................................................. 41 
C The House of Lords Free Speech Amendments ................................ 42 
IX RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN NEW ZEALAND ............................ 44 
A A Justified Liff1itation? ................................................................................. 46 
X ADDRESSING THE FUTURE: CONSTRUCTING A 
JUSTIFIABLE RELIGIOUS HATE SPEECH PRO VISION 
FOR NEW ZEALAND .............................................................. 51 
A Insult and Abuse ..................................................................... 51 
B Proselytisff1 .............. .................................................. ............ 52 
C Consent of the Attorney-General .................................................. 53 
D A Cause for Concern ................................................................ 53 
XI CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 55 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................. 57 
LIB A 
3 
I INTRODUCTION 
The increasing trend within modem Western democracies towards multi-
cultural and multi-faith societies poses a difficult problem for law-making bodies, 
attempting to accommodate often divergent interests. One particular challenge 
involves attempting to promote the rights of minorities when they come into conflict 
with the fundamental right to freedom of expression of others. On the one hand free 
speech is the very lifeblood of democracy. In a functional democracy ideas must be 
free to compete in the market-place of ideas so that individuals can autonomously 
discover 'truth' .1 However, a difficulty arises when certain forms of expression begin 
to impinge upon other competing rights and freedoms. In this context it is particularly 
problematic when the free speech of the majority serves as a basis of discrimination 
against vulnerable minorities. Although it is widely acknowledged that freedom of 
speech has little value if only instances of harmless speech are afforded protection, it 
is equally elementary that no right or freedom can be absolute. 2 
In many Western nations the task of balancing legitimate freedom of speech 
with the rights of religious minorities has been cast into the spotlight in recent years. 
The justifiability of two particular legal protections for religious minorities has 
fuelled fierce controversy. Firstly, the crime of blasphemy, which is essentially "a 
criminal offence penalising insults directed against religion."3 Secondly, the 
prohibition of religious hate speech which outlaws the use of words that are capable 
of inciting others to hatred of identifiable religious groups. 
On one side of the debate, civil libertarians contend that freedom of 
expression is the most fundamental freedom in a democratic society. They believe 
that restrictions upon free speech can only be justified when the speech poses a clear 
and present danger to society through the threat of violence or public disorder. 4 On 
the other hand, pro-censorship theorists argue that there is no value in maintaining a 
right to publicly disseminate material which may ultimately undennine the liberty of 
1 See generally, Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, New York, 2005). 
2 Denise Meyerson "The Legitimate Extent of Freedom of Expression" (2002) 52 UTLJ 331 , 331. 
3 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 145 Offences Against Religion and Public 
Worship (London, 1985) para 2. 1. 
4 
Ethnic Affairs Commission of New South Wales Hate Vilification Legislation With Freedom Of 
Expression: Wh ere ls The Balance? (Queensland, 1994) I 0. 
4 
religious minorities. They argue that it is difficult to see how unhindered free speech 
which perpetuates inequality is elemental to democracy. 
5 
In 1981 and again m 1985 the UK Law Commission published papers 
recommending the abolition of the offence of blasphemy. 6 Since then there has been a 
steady push by law commissions in various jurisdictions towards the abolition of 
blasphemy laws. The law is criticised not only on the basis that it unduly restricts 
freedom of expression in order to prevent the insulting treatment of religion, but also 
that it is discriminatory as it only applies to the Christian faith. 7 Calls for the abolition 
of blasphemy laws were partly responsible for the ensuing debates over the necessity 
of introducing religious hate speech laws to prohibit speech that may have been 
caught at the outer boundary of the offence of blasphemy. 8 
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the prohibition of blasphemy 
or incitement to hatred of religious groups represents a justifiable limitation upon the 
right to freedom of speech in New Zealand. Although the sole prosecution for 
blasphemy in New Zealand's history resulted in an acquittal,9 blasphemy remains a 
crime in New Zealand under section 123 of the Crimes Act 1961. Blasphemous libel 
is commonly understood as only covering written words, however, in New Zealand, 
redress for broadcast blasphemies is provided by way of the complaint process under 
the Broadcasting Act 1989, which requires broadcasters to observe standards of good 
taste and decency. '0 In New Zealand, a prosecution for blasphemy can only proceed 
with the leave of the Attorney-General. 11 In contrast, whilst racial groups are 
currently afforded specific protection from hate speech under sections 61 and 131 of 
the Human Rights Act 1993, New Zealand law does not specifically prohibit hate 
speech directed towards religious groups. However, the necessity of religious hate 
5 Ibid, 12. 
6 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79 Offences Against Religion and Public 
Worship (London, 1981 ); United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 145, above n 3. 
7 See generally, United Kingdom Law Commission, above n 3; New South Wales Law Commission 
Discussion Paper Blasphemy (Sydney, 1994). 
8 Ibid . 
9 R v Glover [ 1922] GLR 185. 
10 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 4; see also, John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media law in New Zealand 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1999). 
11 Crimes Act 1961 , s 123(4). 
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speech laws is a particularly pressing question as the issue has recently reached select 
committee stage in New Zealand. 12 
The paper begins with a brief survey of the competing protections for freedom 
of speech and religious liberty in New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The 
historical development of the offence of blasphemy is then outlined, from the 
conception of the archaic offence in the early Ecclesiastical Courts in the United 
Kingdom, to the modem day jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 
The most significant arguments for and against retention are traversed, culminating in 
the conclusion that blasphemy is entirely incompatible with freedom of speech 
principles and has no legitimate place in New Zealand's modem secular society. 
The paper then proceeds to examme the auns of religious hate speech 
legislation which establish a much more defensible case for limiting free speech. The 
differences between race and religion are highlighted and further developed through 
an examination of the difficulties that religious hate speech laws have created in the 
State of Victoria, Australia. The motivating factors which led to the enactment of the 
United Kingdom religious hatred provision in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 
2006 (UK) are examined and contrasted with New Zealand's current position. It is 
concluded that although religious hate speech laws may represent a justifiable 
limitation upon free speech, they also wield the potential to chill genuine speech and, 
ironically, may in fact undermine religious liberty in some circumstances. Ultimately 
it is suggested that there is little social need in New Zealand for religious hate speech 
laws at present, such that the potential harms threatened by introduction outweigh the 
potential benefits. Nonetheless, an attempt is made to outline the necessary elements 
of a workable and justifiable offence for New Zealand if religious intolerance were to 
become a social problem in the future. 
II MODERN LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS FOR RELIGION 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("NZBORA") contains both a 
guarantee of freedom of expression and the principal protections of religious liberty 
12 Stuart Dye "Backlash on Hate Speech Proposal" ( I 8 March 2005) The New Zealand Herald 
Auckland www.nzherald .co.nz (accessed 6 July 2007). 
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in New Zealand law. Section 14 "Freedom of Expression" provides the right to "seek, 
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form." 13 For present 
purposes, three important provisions that provide specific religious freedoms must be 
mentioned. 14 First, section 13, "Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion", 
provides the right to "freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, including 
the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference." 15 Next, section 15, titled 
"Manifestation of religion and belief', protects the freedom for everybody to openly 
express their religious beliefs "in public or in private." 16 Finally, section 19(1 ), 
"Freedom from discrimination", states: "Everyone has the right to freedom from 
discrimination on the ground of... religious belief." 17 
Importantly, section 5, "Justified limitations", represents a legislative 
confirmation that no rights are absolute. Section 5, is a broad, general, stand alone 
limitation clause. 18 The standard for justification written into section 5 requires that 
for a restriction of a right to be deemed "reasonable" it must be capable of being 
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 19 It must, therefore, be 
convincingly established that any restriction of a right is a necessary measure. 20 
In contrast, the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) adopts the rights and freedoms 
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 ("ECHR"), which 
builds limitations directly into the individual rights. Freedom of expression is 
provided for in Article 10 whereas the principal protection of religious liberty appears 
in Article 9. Importantly, both of these rights are subject to "restrictions or penalties 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society... for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others. "21 
13 New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
14 See generally, Rex J Adhar "Religious Liberty in a Temperate Zone: A Report From New Zealand" 
(2007) 21 Emory lnt'l L Rev 205, 214, for a useful analysis of these provisions. 
15 New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990, s 13. 
16 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 15 . 
17 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s I 9( I). 
18 See generally, Andrew Butler "Limiting Rights" (2002) 33 VUWLR 113, 117; Ministry of Transport 
v Noori [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260. 
19 Ibid , I 18; New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
20 New Zealand Human Rights Commission lnqui, y into Hate Speech (Submission to Government 
Administration Select Committee, 2005), para 6.4. 
2 1 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), I st sch, art 10(2); art 9(2) . 
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III THE CRIME OF BLASPHEMY 
A Historical Development 
In proselytising religions, spreading the word of God is not so much a matter 
of religious liberty as viewed in the eyes of the modern law. It is a religious duty, 
rather than a free choice.22 However, historically attempts to spread the Christian 
message throughout the Graeco-Roman world were met with contempt, for fear that 
public disorder would erupt throughout the multi-faith societies.23 
It is ironic, therefore, that when Clu·istians achieved political ascendancy, the 
law was used as a tool to suppress free speech in order to prevent dissent and quash 
unorthodoxy. 24 This was achieved through the crime of blasphemy, which first 
became a crime in England in the late 17th century when the process of nationalising 
the English church, resulted in the fusing of Christianity as part of the law of 
England. 25 This early fusion of law and religion was affirmed in Taylor's Case which 
established Christianity to be "parcel of the laws of England; and therefore to 
reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of the law. "26 
Two important consequences flowed from the alliance between the Christian 
Church and the State. First, as is apparent from the early formulation of blasphemy in 
Taylor's Case, attacks against religions other than the established Christian Church 
(namely Anglicanism) were not subject to the criminal law. More importantly, 
however, any criticism of the tenets of the Church of England would constitute the 
offence, no matter how reasoned or temperate. In other words, the early formulation 
of blasphemy concerned the "matter and not the manner" of publication. 27 An explicit 
statement of the law of blasphemy as originally conceptualised by the courts is found 
in Alderson B's direction to the jury in Gathercole 's Case. His Honour stated: 28 
A person may, without being liable to prosecution for it, attack Judaism, or 
Mahomedanism, or even any sect of the Christian Religion (save the established 
22 
Rex J Ahdar and Ian Leigh Religious Freedom in the liberal State (Oxford , New York, 2005) 360. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid . 
25 James Davis "Comparing Religion Legally" (2006) 63 WLLR 913, 915 . 
26 Tay lor's Case ( 1676) I Vent 293; 86 ER 189. 
27 
J F Stephen A History of the Criminal law of England (London, Macmillan, 1883) 4 71; New South 
Wales Law Commission, above n 7, para 2.6. 
28 R v Gathercole ( 1838) 2 Lew 23 7, 254; 168 ER I 140. 
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religion of the country); and the only reason why the latter is in a different 
situation from the others is, because it is the form established by law, and is 
therefore part of the constitution of the country. 
By the mid 19th century a marked change in judicial reasoning regarding the 
cnme blasphemy had become apparent. The focus had shifted to the underlying 
nature or manner of the attack, the rationale being to prevent insult and ridicule of 
Christian beliefs.29 Sober and reasoned criticism that appealed to rational judgment 
was no longer under threat, rather words which invoked "wild and improper feelings 
of the human mind."30 The new formulation was significant as it reflected on the fact 
that prosecutions for blasphemy had come to take place amidst fears that public 
disorder would result if the sensitivities of Christian believers were outraged.
31 
B The Crime of Blasphemy Today: Whitehouse v Lemon 
No prosecutions for blasphemy were bought in England between 1922 and 
1979, leading to a proclamation by Lord Denning in 1949 that the offence was a 
"dead letter". 32 However, in the 1979 decision of Whitehouse v Lemon, the House of 
Lords breathed new life into the archaic offence.
33 A private prosecution was upheld 
against the editor and publishing company of Gay News for publishing a poem 
attributing homosexual acts to Christ, "describing in explicit detail acts of sodomy 
and fellatio with the body of Christ immediately after the moment of His death."
34 
The trial judge, King-Hamilton QC, held that a subjective intention to attack 
Christianity was not necessary and the mens rea of the offence was fulfilled by a 
mere intention to publish the impugned material.
35 This was ultimately upheld by the 
House of Lords on appeal essentially confirming the strict liability nature of the 
cnme. 
29 See generally, R v Gott ( 1922) 16 Cr App R 87. 
30 R v Hetherington ( 1841) 4 St Tr NS 563 , 566. 
31 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79, above n 6, para 2.13. 
32 Adhar, above n 22, 368. 
33 Whitehouse v Lemon [ 1979] AC 617 . 
34 Ibid, 618. 
35 See generally, Whitehouse v l emon, above n 33 , 620, where the House of Lords outline the 
important elements of the unreported trial judgment. 
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The Whitehouse v Lemon decision included a number of other striking 
elements. The public good defence available in the Obscene Publications Act 1959 
(UK) was not applied in the context of blasphemy, meaning that the Act could be 
circumvented to bring prosecutions against serious literature. 36 Furthermore, the 
overall thrust of the material complained of could be ignored. 37 All that was necessary 
for the actus reus of the offence was to identify a part of the work that crossed the 
dividing line between moderate and reasoned criticism of Christianity on the one 
hand and immoderate or offensive treatment of Christianity or sacred subjects on the 
other.38 Finally, there was no requirement that the material be likely to arouse 
resentment against religion, or result in a breach of peace. 39 
On appeal the House of Lords affirmed the trial judge's formulation of the 
offence. Lord Scarman attempted to propound a definition encapsulating the essence 
of the modernised offence. His Lordship stated:40 
Every publication is said to be blasphemous which contains any 
contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to God, 
Jesus Christ, or the Bible, or the formularies of the Church of England as 
by law established. It is not blasphemous to speak or publish opinions 
hostile to the Christian religion, or to deny the existence of God, if the 
publication is couched in decent and temperate language. 
C The Satanic Verses 
Islam 1s the second most prevalent religion in the United Kingdom.41 
Nonetheless, m Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Choudhury 
("Choudhury F')42 the English High Court upheld a magistrate's refusal of a summons 
for a writ of blasphemy against the publisher of a book deeply offensive to the 
Muslim community because Islam was not the established religion of the country. 
36 
Helen Fenwick and Howard Davis Civil Liberties and Human Rights (3ed, Cavendish Publishing 
Ltd, Oregon, 2006) 35. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Whitehouse v Lemon, above n 33, 619. 
39 Ibid, 639 Lord Scarman. 
40 Ibid, 642. 
41 
Colin Harvey (ed) Human Rights in the Community: Rights as Agents for Change (Oxford, Oregon, 
2005) 201. 
42 
R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex pa rte Choudhwy [ 1991] All ER 306. 
10 
Watkins LJ stated that even if it was open to the Court to extend the offence to cover 
other religions he would have declined to do so due to the impossibility of confining 
an extended offence within sufficiently clear limits.43 Among His Lordship ' s 
concerns was the difficulty of defining religion.44 Since the mere intention to publish 
the words complained of would constitute the mental element of the offence, there 
was a risk that an author could unknowingly outrage a religion, which he or she had 
no knowledge about.45 Furthermore, the rights of others exception in Article 10(2) of 
the ECHR did not provide a justification for limiting the Article 10 right to freedom 
of expression because there was no pressing social need to suppress the book at the 
centre of the dispute. 46 
This reasonmg applied despite that fact that the book had provoked 
widespread outrage from the Muslim community through its vilification of sacred 
objects of the Islamic faith. Demonstrations against the book had taken place abroad 
where people had died and in the United Kingdom, Muslims of otherwise good 
character were arrested for public order offences committed during similar 
emotionally charged demonstrations.47 The decision was highly controversial and has 
subsequently been widely described as nothing less than discriminatory in a 
pluralistic nation such as the United Kingdom.48 
However, as will be seen in the next sub-section, the European Court of 
Human Rights has missed a number of opportunities to address this concern. 
D A Justifiable Limitation on Free Speech? Decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights 
Due to the absence of prosecutions for blasphemy the New Zealand courts 
have not had the opportunity to balance the limitations which blasphemy law places 
upon freedom of speech against the competing religious rights and freedoms in the 
NZBORA. The position is similar in the United Kingdom as no prosecutions for 
43 Ibid, 3 I 9. 
44 Ibid . 
45 Ibid . 
46 Ibid , 321 . 
47 Ibid, 308. 
48 Javier Garc i ·a Oli va "The Lega l Protecti on of Be li evers and Beli e fs in the United Kingdom" (2007) 
9 Ecc LJ 66, 72. 
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blasphemy have been bought after the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
However, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") has had more than one 
occasion to consider the compatibility of blasphemy law with the Atiicle 10 guarantee 
of freedom of expression and the degree to which freedom of expression may be 
permissibly restricted by the competing right to freedom of religion in Article 9. The 
decisions of the ECtHR and the subsequent academic criticism which these decisions 
have attracted provide a good starting point for a discussion of whether blasphemy 
can be justifiably retained as a crime in New Zealand. 
Following Whitehouse v Lemon, the convicted publisher Gay News, applied to 
the ECtHR, on the basis that the decision was in breach of its Article I O right to 
freedom of expression.49 The application was deemed inadmissible. The ECtHR 
determined that although, prima facie, freedom of expression had been curtailed, the 
interference fell within the rights of others exception in Article 10(2). 50 Dealing with 
the issue of whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society the Court 
held that the religious feelings of citizens may well require protection from 
particular! y severe attacks. 51 
In Choudhury v United Kingdom ("Choudhury II") 52 an application was made 
to the European Commission on Human Rights ("the Commission") alleging that the 
restricted application of blasphemy to the Church of England under English law was 
inconsistent with the Article 9 right to freedom of religion. The Commission was of 
the opinion that the application could not succeed as it was mistaken to interpret 
Article 9 as establishing a positive obligation on states to protect all religious 
sensibilities. 53 
Interestingly, following Choudhury II, the Commission was criticised for 
tending to favour the domestic interests of State parties. 54 However, this looked set to 
49 
X and Y v United Kingdom ( 1983) EHRR 123; see Paul Kearns "The Uncultured God: Blasphemy 
Law's Reprieve and the Art Matrix" (2000) 5 EHRLR 512 , for a useful critique of the blasphemy 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. 
50 Ibid l 25 
51 Ibid: 126: 
52 
Choudhury v United Kingdom ( 1991) 12 HRLJ 172. 
53 Ibid, 176. 
54 Kearns, above n 49, 515. 
12 
change in the later case of Otto-Preminger Jnstitut v Austria ("Otto-Preminger"). 55 
The Austrian authorities had suppressed a film believed to mount an abusive attack 
on Catholicism for fears that its presentation would amount to the crime of 
blasphemy. A private association bought an application against Austria alleging that 
the decision breached its Article 10 right to freedom of expression. 
The majority of the Commission supported the application on the basis that 
the film in question was an artistic work of satire and that recourse to the criminal law 
in this context was unjustified even if the film dealt with religion. The limitation of 
free speech was both unnecessary and disproportionate in a democratic society. 56 
The sense of victory for artistic expression was short lived as the ECtHR 
subsequently disagreed with the opinion of the Commission. The ECtHR found it 
impossible to expound a unifonn conception of the significance of religion applicable 
to all of the member states. Consequently, the ECtHR afforded a margin of 
appreciation to the national authorities to allow a decision to be made domestically 
regarding the degree of permissible interference with freedom of expression 
necessary to protect religious feelings. 57 Although, the ECtHR did warn that the 
margin of appreciation was not unlimited, such that the necessity for any restriction 
on freedom of speech must be convincingly established by the member State.58 
Reaching its conclusion, the ECtHR stated:59 
The Court cannot disregard the fact that the Roman Catholic religion is the 
religion of the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans. In seizing the film, the 
Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent 
that some people should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an 
unwarranted and offensive manner. It is in the first place for the national 
authorities, who are better placed than the international judge, to assess the need 
for such a measure in the light of the situation obtaining locally at a given time. 
55 Otto-Preminger lnstitut v Austria ( 1994) 19 EHRR 34; Kearns, above n 49, 516. 
56 Report of the European Commission of Human Rights ( 14 January, 1993). 
57 Otto-Preminger lnstitut v Austria, above n 55, 56. 
58 Ibid , para 50. 
59 Ibid , para 56. 
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The most recent consideration of the consistency of national blasphemy law 
with the ECHR was undertaken by the ECtHR in 1997, in Wingrove v United 
Kingdom. 60 The application was bought by film director Nigel Wingrove, after the 
British Board of Film Classification refused to grant a distribution certificate for his 
film Visions of Ecstasy, which the Board considered to be blasphemous. The Board 
was concerned that the sexual imagery in the film which focused on the figure of the 
crucified Christ was bound to outrage the Christian faith due to the unacceptable 
treatment of a sacred subject.61 
The judgment of the ECtHR largely reiterates the holdings of its previous 
decisions. The ECtHR held that the crime of blasphemy pursued a legitimate aim, 
even though it only protected the Christian faith. Also, the protection afforded to 
Christian groups fell within the rights of others exception in Article 10(2) and was 
consonant with freedom of religion in Article 9.62 The ECtHR observed that many 
member States still operated national blasphemy laws and left the necessity of these 
laws to be judged within the margin of appreciation previously afforded to individual 
States. The ECtHR observed:63 
Whereas there is little scope under Article 10(2) of the Convention for restrictions 
on political speech or on debate of questions of public interest ... a wider margin of 
appreciation is generally ava ilable to the Contracting States when regulating 
freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal 
convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion . 
The judgments of the ECtHR have been criticised for implicitly elevating 
freedom of religion above freedom of speech. 64 As highlighted, the ECtHR has 
achieved this by invoking the rights of others exception to freedom of expression in 
Article 10(2) of the ECHR, limiting freedom of speech essentially to ensure that 
members of the established Church of England can enjoy their religion free from any 
mental suffering caused by offensive attacks upon their beliefs. 65 However, it is 
60 Wingrove v United Kingdom ( 1997) 24 EHRR 1. 
61 Ibid, 13. 
62 Ibid , 48 . 
63 Ibid , 58. 
64 See generally, Adhar, above n 22, 372; Kearns, above n 49, 520. 
65 Fenwick, above n 36, 37. 
14 
interesting to note the inconsistency in the application of the rights of others 
exception, between the opinion of the Commission in Choudhury II and the 
subsequent decisions of the ECtHR. In Choudhury II the Commission rejected the 
suggestion that State parties were under a positive duty to protect the religious 
sensibilities of all religions in order to uphold their Article 9 right to freedom of 
religion. However, a duty to provide such protections for the established religion was 
accepted by the ECtHR as falling within the rights of others exception in Article 
I 0(2). Thus, it is hardly surprising that the decisions have been described by 
commentators as meaningless and discriminatory.
66 
It is suggested that the opinion of the Commission in Choudhury II represents 
the most rational analysis of the competing rights to freedom of speech and freedom 
of religion. The decisions of the ECtHR have been described as "deeply flawed" 
insofar as they establish that the State is under a positive obligation to secure for 
Christians, the peaceful enjoyment of their religious freedoms.
67 Perhaps the only 
legitimate sphere for the operation of a positive obligation to protect religious liberty 
by limiting offensive speech is in the extreme cases envisaged by the ECtHR in Otto-
Preminger. In that case the ECtHR noted that in some extreme cases an attack upon 
religious beliefs may have the effect of " inhibiting those who hold such beliefs from 
exercising their freedom to hold them."
68 The same conclusion applies in the context 
of the NZBORA, where any expression which positively deterred an individual from 
holding their religious beliefs would pose a substantial limitation on the section 13 
right to freedom of religious belief without interference, and likewise the section 15 
right to manifest religious beliefs in pubic or private. 
If this does represent an acceptable threshold for blasphemy to legitimately 
encroach upon free speech, it seems unlikely that the threshold would have been met 
in any of the aforementioned ECtHR decisions, which notably, exclusively involved 
artistic media. 
66 See generally, Harvey, above n 41 , 207 . 
67 Fenwick, above n 36, 37 . 
68 Otto-Preminger /nstitut v Austria , above n 55 , para 47 . 
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IV THE FUTURE OF BLASPHEMY: ANALYSING THE ARGUMENTS 
In 1981 and 1985, the United Kingdom Law Commission ("UK Law 
Commission") prepared working papers considering the need for the refo1m of 
blasphemy Jaws. The UK U1w Commission examined the strongest arguments for 
both retention and abolition respectively. More recently, in 1994, the New South 
Wales Law Commission ("NSW Law Commission") undertook a similar exercise in 
the area of blasphemy law, w)1ich provides a valuable analysis of all of the major 
arguments from a different social perspective. This section will examine the 
arguments of both Law Commissions with reference to both modem developments 
and prevailing attitudes in New Zeeland, Australia and the United Kingdom, since the 
last successful prosecution for blasphemy in Whitehouse v Lemon. 
A Arguments For the Retention of Blasphemy 
The UK Law Commission considered arguments for the retention of 
blasphemy law under four main categories; the protection of religious sensibilities; 
the protection of society; the protection of individual feelings, and; the protection of 
public order. 
1 The protection of religious sensibilities 
Proponents of this argument suggest that, regardless of offence caused to 
religious followers, the law should punish blasphemy because it undermines Christian 
institutions and is an affront to God.69 Numerous passages in the Bible can be cited as 
a holy warning against blasphemy. For example, Romans 1: 18-32: 
Judgment occurs not only at the end of time but within time. As mankind refuses 
to glorify God, he gives them over to an increasing spiral of depravation and 
corruption. 
These passages give nse to a fear of Christian fundamentalists that mankind's 
toleration of blasphemy will lead to anarchy which no nation will survive.70 
69 
United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79, above n 6, para 7.5 . 
70 
Michael Schluter (ed) Christianity in a Changing World: Biblical Insight on Contempora,y Issues 
(Cambridge Press Ltd, London, 2000) I 16. 
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A public illustration of the Christian conception of blasphemy was observed 
in the United Kingdom recently when two British artists displayed a picture entitled 
"Was Jesus Heterosexual?" with the words "God Loves Fucking" displayed in large 
letters. Although furious that no criminal prosecution was bought against the artists, 
Member of Parliament Ann Widdecombe condemned the exhibition as "blasphemous 
in the extreme" and she warned that irrespective of the law the artists would learn of 
the error of their ways "when they finally stand before the Son of God".
71 
The argument that blasphemy must be retained to preserve the name of God in 
the interests of the entire community is based on the Christian fundamentalist 
conception of blasphemy and ignores the fact that the modem secularised legal 
formulation does not safeguard Christianity from all hostile attacks, only attacks that 
go beyond the threshold of decency. Furthermore, the UK Law Commission noted 
that this argument is based upon "the questionable assertion that that the Christian 
God, but none other, is in need of some kind of legal protection."
72 Clearly, the fear 
that a wrathful God may unleash His tyranny over a society which undermines His 
name is not restricted to the Christian faith alone. 
2 The protection of society 
This argument suggests that blasphemy should result in criminal sanctions 
because, for a significant number of people, religious beliefs hold a unique place in 
society. Freedom to insult religion would threaten the stability of society and 
encourage division between different racial and religious groups.
73 However, as the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences observed, this argument 
assumes that the threat of prosecution effectively deters artists, comedians and the 
media from disseminating blasphemous material. 
74 Furthermore, the Select 
Committee stated that if blasphemy was abolished it was unlikely that the floodgates 
would open to a barrage of offensive attacks against religion. Such an assertion by 
71 Stephen Drake "Review - Gilbert & George, Sonofagod Pictures "Was Jesus Heterosexual?" (I 
February 2006) Th e Londonist www.londonist.com (accessed 14 August 2007). 
72 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 145, above n 3, para 2.23 . 
73 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79, above n 6, para 7.7 . 
74 House of Lords Select Committee " Religious Offences in England and Wales" ( I O April 2003) 95-1 
para 38. 
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concerned groups failed to take into account that any other religion could already be 
targeted with impunity. 75 
The NSW Law Commission made a similar observation in 1994, when it 
recommended the abolition of the crime of blasphemy in New South Wales: "The 
Commission doubts whether the offence of blasphemy has any existing deterrent 
effect, given that the offence is so obscure, prosecutions are so rare, and the penalty 
largely unknown."76 Both the NSW and the UK Law Commissions were in agreement 
that the criminal law is neither an appropriate nor effective means of enforcing 
respect for religious beliefs.77 
3 The protection of individual feelings 
The UK Law Commission suggested that the strongest argument for the 
retention of blasphemy was to protect the feelings of those people with deeply held 
religious beliefs. For many people, religious beliefs are often more susceptible to 
offence than any other sphere of their lives due to the "special reverence for what is 
deemed sacred".78 Indeed, psychological studies show that sometimes religious 
beliefs are intertwined with a believer's sense of self and attacks upon religion have 
the potential to cause real mental suffering. 79 
Again, both the NSW and the UK Law Commissions had difficultly finding a 
justification for the special attention of the criminal law in order to protect Christian 
beliefs alone. 80 The UK Law Commission was concerned that the reverence felt by a 
religious believer for what they deemed sacred did not truly differ in kind from the 
reverence felt by other people in society for political institutions, the Monarchy or 
even the national flag. Thus it is arguable that if free speech is restricted to protect 
religious sensibilities, similar protections should be available for those who have a 
75 Ibid. 
76 ew South Wales Law Commission, above n 7, para 4.22. 
77 
United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79, above n 6, para 7.1 O; United Kingdom 
Law Commission Working Paper No. 145, above n 3, para 2.24; New South Wales Law Commission, 
above n 7, para 4.23. 
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Law Commission, above n 7, para 4.25 . 
18 
similar unqualified reverence for other deeply held beliefs.
81 However, it is 
undeniable that extending protections to all of the cases referred to above would 
involve an intolerable assault upon free speech. 
4 The protection of public order 
This argument alludes to an inherent danger that insulting attacks directed 
towards religion and religious beliefs will result in civil disorder. Even where 
blasphemous speech does not directly incite public disorder there may be a risk of 
later premeditated action by an offended individual or group.
82 
In the United Kingdom, the threat to the stability of society posed by 
blasphemous material became an accepted rationale for the suppression of offending 
material in the middle of the 19th century. However, as noted previously, this 
rationale for the offence was eroded by Lord Scarman in Whitehouse v Lemon, as His 
Lordship did not think it necessary that the impugned material posed a tendency 
towards a breach of peace. 83 
Furthermore, in 1991 , the civil unrest among the Muslim community in the 
United Kingdom was more serious following the publication of The Satanic Verses, 
than has been seen from the Christian community following the publication of 
allegedly blasphemous material , offensive to Christians.
84 Nonetheless, even though 
Watkins LJ explicitly mentioned in Choudhury I that Muslim demonstrations against 
the book had resulted in arrests and convictions for public order offences, His 
Lordship was not prepared to extend the ambit of blasphemy outside of the Church of 
England. 
The futility of the public order justification is further highlighted by the 
experience in New South Wales where there has only been one prosecution for 
blasphemy in the last 120 years. In the words of the NSW Law Commission: "The 
outcry resulting from the penalty imposed upon the convicted blasphemer caused far 
81 United Kingdom Law Commiss ion Working Paper o. 145, above n 3, para 2.40. 
82 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79, above n 6, para 7.2 3. 
83 See Part Ill B The Crime of Blasphemy Today: Whitehouse v Lemon. 
84 0 See generally, Harvey, above n 41 , 2 7. 
19 
more civil unrest than the material which the prosecution was intended to suppress."85 
Given the similar position in New Zealand where there has only ever been one 
prosecution for blasphemy, which was unsuccessful, the public outcry against a 
modem day prosecution would also be likely to create quite a controversy. 
B Arguments Against the Retention of Blasphemy 
Both the New South Wales and the UK Law Commissions considered the 
defects in the existing law of blasphemy persuasive and ultimately recommended its 
abolition without replacement.86 In fact, as noted by the NSW Law Commission, 
every law commission that has considered the reform of blasphemy law worldwide 
has recommended its abolition.87 Of the factors examined by the foreign law 
commissions, the following are the most compelling arguments against the retention 
of blasphemy law in New Zealand: the uncertainty and strict liability nature of the 
existing offence; its restriction to the Christian faith, and; the unlikelihood of any 
successful modem day prosecutions. 
I Uncertainty and strict liability 
The chequered development of the cnme of blasphemy and the rarity of 
modem judicial decisions in the area has resulted in widespread disagreement in the 
academic literature over the necessary elements of the crime. This is confounded in 
New Zealand given that in the view of Hosking J, who presided over the sole 
prosecution for blasphemy in R v Glover, the basis of the offence is to prevent 
disorder and violence in the community. 88 Thus, it is unclear whether any future 
prosecutions in New Zealand would follow the United Kingdom decision in 
Whitehouse v Lemon, which did away with the public order foundation of the offence 
altogether. However, given that R v Glover was decided in 1922, the more recent 
judgments in the United Kingdom would be highly influential. 
When an accused is prosecuted for blasphemy it becomes a matter for a jury 
to decide whether the material complained about is "scurrilous," "abusive" or 
85 New South Wales Law Commission, above n 7, para 4.22 . 
86 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper o. 79, above n 6, para 9.2; United Kingdom 
Law Commission Working Paper No. 145, above n 3, para 2.57; New South Wales Law Commission, 
above n 7, para 4.82. 
87 ew South Wales Law Commission, above n 7, para 2.2. 
88 R v Glover, above n 9, 187 Hosking J. 
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"offensive" to the Christian religion. 89 The UK Law Commission observed that 
defining the boundaries of a criminal offence with reference to several adjectives to 
be applied by a jury is wholly unsatisfactory. "[I]t is hardly an exaggeration to say 
that whether or not a publication is a blasphemous libel can only be judged ex post 
facto." 90 Although it may be true that many people accused of a crime are routinely at 
the mercy of a jury and may not be able to judge from the outset whether or not their 
conduct passes the threshold of liability, the concern is particularly worrying in the 
realm of blasphemy. Where free speech is at stake the bounds of legitimate 
expression should be clearly defined, to avoid the risk of chilling genuine public 
debate or criticism of religion. It is beyond dispute that in a modern democracy, 
religion must tolerate criticism. An individual exercising their undoubted right to free 
speech should be able to do so knowing just how far this criticism may reasonably go. 
This is not possible in the existing offence of blasphemy. 91 
Compounding the problem of uncertainty is the fact that blasphemy is a strict 
liability crime. The only intention relevant is an intention to publish the impugned 
material, regardless of whether the defendant intended to offend religious 
susceptibilities.92 Thus, the offence could be committed by a Christian with deeply 
held religious beliefs who would be subsequently unable to bring evidence of an 
underlying sincere intention in publishing the subject matter of the complaint.93 The 
strict liability nature of the crime is also concerning in light of the fact that the most 
recent prosecutions have almost exclusively centered upon artistic media. For 
example, Paul Kearns argues that artistic expression in particular should be free from 
the reach of blasphemy law.94 However, a legitimate counter-argument is that artists 
may often set out with the very intention to cause offence to religious groups. Indeed, 
the publicity surrounding a controversial artwork is an effective way for artists to 
increase their exposure. 
89 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79, above n 6, para 6.1. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Whitehouse v Lemon, above n 33. 
93 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79, para 6.7. 
94 Kearns, above n 49, 520. 
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2 Restriction to the Church of England 
In Whitehouse v Lemon, Lord Scarman rejected the proposition that 
blasphemy was an archaic offence serving no useful purpose in modem law and 
expressed an obiter opinion that the offence should be extended by legislation to 
respect the diverse range of beliefs in a modem pluralistic society, by offering 
protection from offence to all religions. 95 Similarly, Marcus Tregilgas-Davey makes a 
similar case for the extension of blasphemy laws: 96 
[E]xtending (or abolishing) the blasphemy laws would not be undermining 
Christianity, rather it would be a public welcoming to the multi-faith, multi-racial 
society in which we live, and as such it would be a formal acceptance of all our 
citizens, no matter what their religion. The existence of a blasphemy law which 
protects only one religious sect forbids this, thus far from having a cohesive effect 
on society ... it prevents the cohesion of our plural society. 
On the other hand, Watkins LJ, in Choudhwy I, stated that although it was a 
gross anomaly that blasphemy law only extended to the established Church, extension 
of the sphere of protection to other religions was not a justifiable option. His Lordship 
stated: 97 
The existence of an extended law of blasphemy would encourage intolerance, 
divisiveness and unreasonable interference with freedom of expression. 
Fundamentalist Christians, Jews or Muslims could then seek to invoke the offence 
of blasphemy against each other's religion, doctrines, tenets, commandments or 
practices; for example... for denying the divine inspiration of the Prophet 
Mohammed. 
However, this argument rests largely on the mistaken assumption that one religious 
group may bring a prosecution claiming that the mere expression of the beliefs of 
another religious group has caused them offence. This assertion ignores the fact that 
the modem formulation of blasphemy concerns the manner and not the content of an 
attack upon religion. 
95 Whitehouse v Lemon, above n 33, 644. 
96 
Marcus Tregilgas-Davey "Ex parte Choudhury: An Opportunity Missed" ( 1991) 54 MLR 294, 296. 
97 R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendia,y Magistrate, ex pa rte Choudhury, above n 42, 320. 
22 
In New Zealand, the restriction of blasphemy to the Christian faith also sits 
uneasily with the fact that New Zealand has never had an established Church. This 
was confirmed by the Supreme Court at beginning of the twentieth century98 and 
again by the Court of Appeal in Mabon v. Confederation of the Church of New 
Zealand, in 1998: "Unlike England and Scotland, New Zealand does not have a 
national established church."99 On the other hand, there have traditionally been many 
indicators which signal the de facto establishment of the Christian Church. 100 Rex 
Ahdar gives examples such as: the opening prayer recited by the Speaker in the 
House of Representatives; the swearing of oaths on the Bible, and; public holidays 
such as Christmas Day, Good Friday, and Easter Monday. 101 However, Adhar argues 
that from about the 1960's "the wresting of generic Christianity from its position of 
cultural ascendancy commenced." 102 Indicators include, regular criticism of the 
Speakers prayer in Parliament; the opening up of the commercial sector to trading on 
Sundays, which is the traditional day of Christian observance, and; the flouting of the 
law by many shop owners defiantly opening on Easter weekend. 103 
Julian Rivers argues that it is justifiable that Christianity is awarded special 
protection in law because Christianity promotes the fundamental societal values of a 
modem democracy. Rivers contends that instances where free speech is censored to 
protect Christian values can actually serve to maximise free speech in general, 
because Christianity is in turn committed to that very freedom. 104 This argument is 
clearly inconsistent with the historical underpinnings of the law of blasphemy. 
Recourse to the criminal law was used to establish and maintain the pre-eminence of 
Christianity as the established faith to the detriment of all others. 105 As the NSW Law 
Commission insightfully observed: 106 
98 Carrigan v Redwood [ 1911] 30 NZLR 244, 252 (SC) ("There is no State Church here. The Anglican 
Church in New Zealand is in no sense a State Church ... and, although no doubt it has a very large 
membership, it stands legally on no higher ground than any of the other religious denominations in 
New Zealand."). 
99 Mabon v. Confederation of the Church of New Zealand [ 1998] 3 NZLR 513 , 523 (CA). 
100 
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It would be perverse indeed if concepts of pluralism and multiculturalism were 
used to justify the retention and significant expansion of a criminal offence which 
was developed precisely to enforce the maintenance of a single set of established 
beliefs by severely punishing expressions of dissent. 
3 Impossibility of securing a conviction today 
One could be forgiven for arguing that that the crime of blasphemy is legally 
irrelevant in New Zealand, given that the only prosecution took place over 75 years 
ago and was ultimately unsuccessful. However, there are compelling arguments 
which demonstrate that so long as blasphemy continues to remam on the statute 
books in New Zealand, its relevance will continue to be felt. 
Firstly, a number of submissions to the NSW Law Commission expressed a 
fear that the rarity of prosecutions in modem times may lead to complacency which 
stifles the need for active refonn: 107 
The lack of successful prosecutions should not be used as a rationale for making 
no change. Long dormant offences, particularly those restricting freedom of 
speech, have a habit of being revived when least expected. 
The reality of this concern is clear from the expenence m the United 
Kingdom, where, to the disbelief of many, the offence that had lay donnant for more 
than 50 years and was believed to be a 'dead letter ' was resuscitated in Whitehouse v 
Lemon. 
However, perhaps more important from New Zealand's perspective is that 
applications for the Attorney-General's leave to bring a prosecution for blasphemy, 
still continue today. For example, in 1998, the national museum Te Papa displayed a 
work by artist Tania Kovats, entitled 'Virgin in a Condom', a seven-centimetre high 
statute of the Virgin Mary covered by a condom. The display provoked outrage from 
Christian groups and provoked a Member of Parliament and a Priest to bring an 
application to the Solicitor-General to prosecute for blasphemous libet. 108 
107 New South Wales Law Commission, above n 7, para 4.12. 
108 Burrows, above n I 0, 325. 
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The 1998 application was ultimately unsuccessful. To his credit the Solicitor-
General placed some weight on the fact that the complaint involved artistic 
expression and was incorporated in an exhibition for which a charge was made. Thus, 
it was a matter of individual choice whether or not to view the artwork. 109 However, 
the continuing threat of prosecution, even if applications are ultimately unsuccessful, 
poses a risk of chilling legitimate speech by forcing publishers to undertake editorial 
decisions to eliminate material that may later be deemed immoderately offensive to 
Christian beliefs. 
On the other hand, it is more likely that in reality artists discount the 
possibility of a dramatic revival of blasphemy law. Thus, the law of blasphemy can 
actually benefit artists financially as the controversy stirred up over a threatened 
prosecution generates far greater exposure than the artist would have secured 
otherwise. No better illustration of this point can be found than the controversy 
surrounding the proposed airing of the South Park 'Bloody Mary' episode in New 
Zealand in 2006. The cartoon, which depicted a menstruating statute of the Virgin 
Mary was widely condemned by Catholic Church leaders in New Zealand who called 
for the country's 500,000 Catholics to boycott the television station responsible for 
airing the cartoon and threatened legal proceedings.' ' 0 However, the threat of legal 
proceedings did not deter the broadcaster. In fact, a decision was made to screen the 
episode three months earlier than originally scheduled to cash in on the heightened 
interest surrounding the controversy. The decision was ultimately a lucrative one, as 
six times the normal audience tuned in to watch the controversial episode. 111 
Shortly after the episode was broadcast a number of concerned parties acted 
on the prior threat and joined together to lodge a formal complaint with the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority ("BSA"), claiming that the broadcast breached a 
number of the standards in the Free-to-Air Code of Broadcasting Practice. 112 
109 Solicitor-General "Virgin in a Condom" (27 March 1998) Press Release. 
110 "Catholics Urge South Park Boycott" (2 l February 2006) www.news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 15 July 
2007). 
111 "Bloody Mary Show Attracts Six Times Usual Audience" (23 February 2006) NZPA 
www.stuff.co.nz (accessed 15 July 2007). 
11 2 The legal authority for a member of the public to lodge a claim with the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority is found in the Broadcasting Act 1989, s 8( I )(a); Section 21 (I)( e) of the same Act empowers 
the Broadcasting Standards Authority to encourage the development and observance by broadcasters of 
codes of broadcasting practice. 
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Two specific arguments raised by the complainants were firstly, that the 
broadcast breached Standard 2 (maintenance of law and order) because it contravened 
the blasphemous libel provisions of the Crimes Act 1961 , and secondly, that the 
broadcast breached Standard 6 (fairness) because it discriminated against and 
denigrated all Catholics and Christians. 113 The BSA rejected the claim based on 
blasphemous libel as it was a matter for the Attorney-General, 114 however the 
reasoning in the decision still provides a valuable insight into the scope of blasphemy 
related claims in New Zealand. First, the BSA held that it was legitimate for 
broadcasters to satirise religious beliefs. Although the Catholic Church was 
understandably deeply offended by the cartoon, this ignored the fact that for other 
people, religious miracles might be seen as folly. 11 5 Secondly, at different points in 
the decision, the BSA alluded to the appropriate balance between the protection of the 
broadcaster' s freedom of speech on the one hand, and the protection of religious 
sensibilities on the other. Striking the balance clearly in favour of free speech, the 
BSA stated: "penalising a broadcaster simply because it has caused religious offence 
would, in the Authority's view, be an unreasonable limitation on the broadcaster's 
· h fr · ,,11 6 ng t to ee express10n. 
It is noteworthy that in New Zealand the BSA has consistently maintained that 
the right to satirise religious beliefs is within the scope of legitimate free speech. 11 7 
This is in contrast to the decision of the ECtHR in Otto-Preminger, which, as was 
outlined earlier, 11 8 held that the censorship of a film satirising religious beliefs by the 
Austrian authorities was within the legitimate margin of appreciation afforded to 
individual European States. The New Zealand approach is a good indication that the 
modern secular society in New Zealand attaches a greater weight to free speech, than 
to the protection of religious groups from the offensive treatment of their beliefs. 
Thus, whilst the continuing threat of a prosecution for blasphemy may chill the 
speech of some publishers, broadcasters and artists, it is more likely that the most 
113 Can West TV Works and 35 Complainants (28 June 2006) Broadcasting Standards Authority 
2006/022 . 
114 Ibid , para 33. 
11 5 Ibid , para I 30. 
116 Ibid , para 136. 
117 See for example, Can West TVWorks and New Zealand Catholic Bishops ' Conference (4 May 2006) 
Broadcasting Standards Authority 2005/1 I 2 . 
118 See Part 111 D A Justifiable Limitation on Free Speech? Decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
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controversial among them welcome the thought of a media circus surrounding what 
they perceive as a futile threat. 
Indeed, in 2002, the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences 
stated that a modem day prosecution for blasphemy is bound to fail on one or more of 
the grounds that it is discriminatory (in only protecting Christians), uncertain and a 
law of strict liability. 119 A year earlier, in 2001, the then Home Secretary, David 
Blunkett, declared publicly that it would soon be necessary to confine blasphemy to 
history. However, the long anticipated abolition of blasphemy law in the United 
Kingdom, which was expected to coincide with the introduction of measures to 
outlaw religious hatred in 2006, is yet to eventuate. 120 Nonetheless, Parliament's 
failure to officially abolish the law has not prevented free speech proponents from 
taking matters into their own hands to demonstrate that modem day prosecutions are 
no longer a real threat. On the 25th anniversary of the conviction of Gay News in 
Whitehouse v Lemon for publishing a poem implying that Jesus was a homosexual, 
several of Britain's leading writers, academics and Members of Parliament publicly 
read the same poem to a crowd in Trafalgar Square. When the police failed to 
intervene, Peter Tatchell, one of the human rights campaigners in attendance, 
exclaimed: 121 
No one was arrested. The police didn 't even take our names and addresses. The 
blasphemy law is now a dead letter. 1 f the authorities are not prepared to enforce 
the law, they should abolish it. 
V THE WAY FORWARD 
The margin of appreciation that the ECtHR has traditionally afforded to 
member States in striking a balance between free speech and protection of religious 
liberty reflects the fact that the appropriate balance between these competing rights 
varies depending upon the changing social and legal climate of each country. In New 
Zealand the crime of blasphemy is not, and arguably never has been, a necessary part 
of the legal or social landscape. In light of section 5 of the NZBORA, freedom of 
speech should only be curtailed where a compelling countervailing right demands 
119 House of Lords Select Committee, above n 74, para 43. 
120 Olivia, above n 48, 72. 
121 Peter Tatchell "Blasphemy Law is Dead" www.petertatchell.net (accessed 28 July 2007). 
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priority. Protecting the private feelings of the Christian members of society is not a 
sufficiently compelling objective. Furthermore, the abolition of blasphemy is 
important for the symbolic purpose of signalling the equality of all religions under the 
law. 
A necessary part of the refonn process is to address any perceived gaps in the 
law which may be left vulnerable to exploitation if blasphemy is abolished. One 
perceived gap may be found at the outer limits of the reach of blasphemy law as 
envisaged in Otto-Preminger, where an attack upon an individual's religious beliefs 
positively deters the individual from holding the belief. 122 However, the fundamental 
distinction between censorship with the aim of preventing positive discrimination and 
the cun-ent blasphemy law is that the former affords protection to religious believers 
whereas the latter protects religious beliefs. 123 Perhaps this distinction demarcates a 
boundary between legitimate and illegitimate state interference with freedom of 
expression. Intuitively, we may feel more comfortable about restricting speech, to 
safeguard a group of people from hann as opposed to their belief system. 
One possible reform measure that would be capable of filling this gap, should 
blasphemy law be abolished in New Zealand, is the introduction of laws criminalising 
the incitement of hatred towards religious groups. Unlike blasphemy, which serves to 
enhance feelings of religious discrimination for minority religions outside of the 
established Church, religious hate speech legislation would extend protection to all 
religions equally. 
VI RELIGIOUS HATE SPEECH 
A The Rationale for Prohibiting Hate Speech 
In 1966 a Special Committee ("the Cohen Committee") was appointed in 
Canada to advise the Minister of Justice on the need for measures to be adopted to 
combat hate propaganda. The subsequent report of the Cohen Committee provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the potential harms caused by hate speech. 124 Following 
the enactment of hate speech legislation in Canada the findings of the Cohen 
122 Otto-Preminger lnstitut v Austria , above n 55, para 47. 
123 Oliva, above n 48, 67. 
124 
Andrew Brewin "A Review of The Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda" ( 1967) 
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Committee have been utilised by the Canadian Courts to justify the legislative 
intrusion upon free speech. 125 
Importantly, in the leading Supreme Court of Canada judgment, R v Keegstra, 
Dickson CJ points out that hate propaganda is not challenged merely on the grounds 
of offensiveness, but rather due to the real harm it is capable of causing. 126 His 
Honour goes on to note two distinct types of harm that can result from hateful speech. 
First, members of a targeted group may suffer serious psychological consequences. 
They may be humiliated and degraded and experience a loss of self-worth and self-
esteem.1 27 This painful reaction may pressure individuals to either avoid activities that 
may bring them into contact with people outside of their immediate group or to 
renounce their differences and attempt to integrate with the majority. 128 
Secondly, hate messages have the ability to subtly influence other members of 
society, convincing listeners of the inferiority of the targeted racial or religious 
group. 129 Richard Delgardo, an influential proponent of hate vilification laws, argues 
that hate messages perpetuate stereotypes of minorities in the minds of the public. 130 
As stereotypes are reinforced, discrimination against minorities increases. For 
example, landlords may begin to "act on unarticulated feelings in renting an 
apartment to a white over an equally qualified black or Mexican." 131 
In R v Keegstra , Dickson CJ observed that the appropriate balance between 
freedom of expression and other competing rights will vary between jurisdictions. 
The varying weight that different countries place on a given value is a reflection upon 
the unique history underpinning each society. 132 lncreasingly, countries which model 
themselves as modem democracies are finding it necessary to limit the boundaries of 
free speech in order to protect religious minorities from hate propaganda and the real 
harm that it can cause. 
125 See generally, R v Keegstra [ 1990) 3 SCR 697. 
126 Ibid, para 64. 
127 Ibid. 
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Some notable examples include, section 29B of the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006 (UK), which makes it a criminal offence for a person to use 
threatening words or behaviour if he intends thereby to stir up religious hatred. 
Similarly, it is an offence under section 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code to incite 
hatred against an identifiable group, which is defined in section 318( 4) as meaning 
"any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin".
133 
Finally, the Australian State of Victoria recently passed the Racial and Religious 
Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic). Section 8 of the Act affords a broad protection to religious 
believers, prohibiting any person from engaging in conduct that incites hatred against, 
serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of a person on the ground of their 
religious belief or activity. 134 
B The Existing Framework in New Zealand 
It is an offence in New Zealand under the Crimes Act 1961 to incite another 
person to commit a criminal offence, including threats of violence directed toward 
any person, regardless of their racial or religious origins. 135 The Human Rights Act 
1993 also specifies a number of areas (for example, in the provision of housing or 
access to education) where discrimination is unlawful on the grounds of both race and 
religion. Furthennore, racial groups are afforded specific protection from hateful 
speech through provisions contained in the Human Rights Act 1993. Section 61 
makes it unlawful to make public, words which are threatening, abusive or insulting if 
the words are likely to excite hostility against any group of persons based on colour, 
race, or ethnic or national origins. 136 Section 131 of the Human Rights Act makes the 
same acts a criminal offence if committed with the intent of exciting hostility or ill-
will against any such group. 137 
The origins of the domestic racial hatred provisions in sections 61 and 131 of 
the Human Rights Act 1993 can be traced back to New Zealand's obligations under 
Article 4(a) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
133 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, s 318(4) (emphasis added). 
134 In addition, Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 200 I (Vic), s 25, establishes a criminal offence of 
serious religious vilification where the offender intentionally engages in conduct which the offender 
knows is likely to incite hatred towards a class of persons on the grounds of their religion . 
135 Crimes Act 1961 , s66( I )(d); s3 I I (2). 
136 Human Rights Act 1993, s 61 (I). 
137 Human Rights Act 1993 , s 131 (I). 
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Discrimination ("CERD"), which requires State parties to declare incitement to racial 
discrimination an offence punishable by law. New Zealand is also a party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). Article 20.2 of the 
ICCPR is stated in similar terms to Article 4(a) of the CERD, however, incitement to 
religious hatred is specifically included as a ground of prohibited conduct. 138 
In 2005 the Government Administration Select Committee launched an 
inquiry into whether legislation was needed in New Zealand to place tighter controls 
upon public broadcast or publication of hate speech. The inquiry followed the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Living Word Distributors Limited v Human Rights 
Action Group, 139 which deemed that two Christian videos critical of homosexuality 
and the homosexual lifestyle were not objectionable for the purposes of the Films, 
Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993. The 2005 inquiry examined a 
proposal to extend the protections already afforded to racial groups to include other 
minority groups, which may be the target of hateful speech, such as homosexuals and 
1. · 140 re 1g1ous groups. 
On the surface this appears a laudable aim. Why should racial groups be 
singled out over religious adherents for protection from hateful speech which in both 
cases has the consequence of marginalising the target group and portraying the 
members of the group as less valuable members of society? The answer to this 
difficult question requires a deeper examination of three important issues. Firstly, the 
conceptual differences between race and religion. Secondly, the real consequences for 
the application of hate speech laws that these differences entail. Finally, the influence 
that New Zealand's unique historical record of religious tolerance should have upon 
the balancing exercise between freedom of expression and religious equality. 
138 See generally, New Zealand Human Rights Commission, above n 20, for a deeper analysis of New 
Zealand's obligations under the CERD and the ICCPR. 
139 Living Word Distributors Ltd v Human Rights Action Group Inc (Wellington) [2003] 3 NZLR 570 
(CA). 
140 Dye, above n 12. 
31 
VII THE DANGERS OF PROHIBITING RELIGIOUS HATE SPEECH 
A Race and Religion are Different in Kind 
The United Kingdom introduced legislation to criminalise conduct 
responsible for stirring up racial hatred as early as 1965. 
141 Amidst fears that the 
provision would not apply to incitement against Jews, the Home Secretary offered 
reassurances that the provision would extend to ethno-religious groups such as Jews, 
however, expressed opposition to any further widening to cover other religious 
· h 142 groups, statmg t at: 
If we are legislating about stirring up hatred against people for something they 
cannot help, it is permissible to be rather more drastic in our interference in what 
may or may not be said than if we were legislating about stirring up hatred on 
grounds which people can help . People can change their religion ... It is utterly 
different from something which they cannot help, such as the colour of their skin. 
The notion that people are free to change their religion may sit uneasily with 
many people. To devout religious adherents of any faith, the idea of freely changing 
their beliefs may seem absurd. Recall that one of the strongest arguments for the 
retention of blasphemy laws is that religious beliefs are often intertwined with a 
believer's sense of self. 143 However, it is not suggested that if an individual is 
subjected to hateful speech on the ground of their religion they should simply uproot 
their belief system and choose to follow another faith. If the only legitimate means of 
avoiding vilification was for religious adherents to adopt a different faith, their right 
to manifest their religion provided in section 15 of the NZBORA would be seriously 
impaired. 
What is open to question, however, is the point at which an attack on a group 
based on their religious beliefs truly crosses the line from genuine and passionate 
criticism of their belief system and into the realm of vilification. The fact that an 
individual voluntarily adopts a religion suggests that the threshold between genuine 
comment and hate vilification must necessarily be drawn at a higher level than with 
141 Section 6( I) of the Race Relations Act 1965 (UK) inserted an offence of inciting racial hatred into 
the Public Order Act 1936 (UK), which required "an intent to stir up hatred against any section of the 
public in Great Britain distinguished by colour, race or ethnic or national origins". 
142 House of Commons, Standing Committee B (Race Relations Act) 27 May 1965, col 82-83, (Sir 
Frank Soskice). 
143 See Part IV A 3 Protection of individual feelings. 
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regard to race. Consider a hateful attack directed toward a racial group. It is clearly 
nonsensical to suggest that it is wrong to belong to a particular racial group. It is 
much more feasible on the other hand to suggest that a particular religious group is 
wrong to adhere to the belief system, which they choose to follow. A submission by 
the British Humanist Society to the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious 
Offences is particularly illuminating. The Society argued that the differences between 
race and religion impacted upon the degree of restriction which could legitimately be 
placed on freedom of expression: 144 
Restrictions are far more easily defended in the case of race (and to a large extent 
of gender, sexual orientation and other common grounds of unwarranted 
discrimination and prejudice), since race is in a sense without content: it has no 
ideology, teachings or dogma ; organisations are rarely based on racial or ethnic 
groups and when that are they exercise little power in the world. What is at issue 
when people are characterised by or criticised for their race is their irrevocable 
identity as individuals or groups of persons. 
Religion is merely a collection of ideas about the physical and spiritual world, 
each religion must be free to compete in the marketplace of ideas. If an individual is 
to make a truly informed choice between radically different faiths they must be 
exposed to arguments which purport to reveal the folly of a given religious doctrine, 
even if these arguments cast a negative light over the religion in question. 145 Thus, 
although many religious groups would not feel that they were free to change their 
religion, they nonetheless choose to place their faith in one set of religious ideology 
and doctrine over another. It is in this sense that the ability to choose a religion 
highlights a pressing need to protect discourse related to religion and demarcates a 
bright-line dividing religion from race. 
Often an individual's initial life choice to follow one particular religion over 
another is made as a result of the proselytizing efforts ofreligious groups. Indeed, the 
144 House of Lords Select Committee, above n 74, para 80; The British Humanist Association is an 
organisation of the United Kingdom which promotes Humanism. The mission statement on its website 
reads: "The BHA is committed to secularism, human rights, democracy, equality and mutual respect. It 
works for an open and inclusive society with freedom of belief and speech, and for an end to the 
privileged position of religion in law, education, broadcasting and wherever else it occurs." 
www.humanism.org.uk (accessed 25 August 2007). 
145 Amir Butler "Muzzling the Haters Doesn 't Make the Hate Vanish" (4 January 2005) The Age 
Melbourne www.theage.com/au (accessed 6 July 2007). 
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freedom of a religious adherent to proselytise can be described as a fundamental 
pillar of religious liberty. 146 Thus, it is ironic that the very laws designed to uphold 
the rights of believers have the real potential to undern1ine one of their most 
significant freedoms by prohibiting some aggressive proselytising effo1is as hateful. 
The reality of this fear among religious groups was demonstrated in a vehement 
attack upon the Victorian Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic), by Amir 
Butler, the executive director of the Australian Muslim Public Affairs Committee. He 
stated: 147 
If we believe our religion is the only way to Heaven, then we must also affirm that 
all other paths lead to Hell. If we believe our religion is true, then it requires us to 
believe others are false. Yet, this is exactly what this law serves to outlaw and 
curtail: the right of believers of one faith to passionately argue against or warn 
against the beliefs of another. 
During the debates preceding the introduction of the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006 (UK), Christian academics also expressed concerns about the impact 
of hate speech laws on the religious freedom to proselytise. Ahdar and Leigh were 
unconvinced by reassurances of the Horne Secretary's commitment to legitimate 
freedom of speech and freedom of religion. 148 The Home Secretary was of the 
opinion that genuine religious debate, criticism and proselytism could be undertaken 
without using threatening, abusive or insulting language that is intended to stir up 
hatred. 149 Although this ideal is attractive, the consequences for the application of 
religious hate speech laws in reality have often diverged significantly from the ideal. 
The Attorney-General of India, Mr Soli Sorabjee, recently commented on the impact 
ofreligious hate speech laws in India: 150 
[E]xperience shows that criminal laws prohibiting hate speech and expression will 
encourage intolerance, divisiveness and unreasonable interference with freedom of 
expression. Fundamentalist Christians, religious Muslims and devout Hindus 
would then seek to invoke the criminal machinery against each other's religion, 
tenets or practices. That is what is increasingly happening today in India. We need 
146 Olivia, above n 48, 69. 
147 Amir Butler "Why I've Changed My Mind on Victoria's Anti-Vilification Laws" (4 June 2004) The 
Afe Melbourne www.theage.com/ au (accessed 6 July 2007). 
14 Ahdar, above n 14, 382. 
149 Ibid. 
150 House of Lords Select Committee, above n 74, para 52. 
34 
not more repressive laws but free speech to combat bigotry and to promote 
tolerance. 
As the next section shows, Mr Sorabjee's fears have not been overstated. The 
use of religious hate speech laws by one religious group as a tool to undermine the 
freedoms of another religious group is not unique to India. The Australian state of 
Victoria is beginning to grapple with the ramifications of its broadly drafted 
prohibition of religious hate speech in the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 
(Vic). 
B The Victorian Example 
The recent experience in Victoria following the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria in Catch The Fire Ministries Inc. v Islamic Council of Victoria 151 
("Catch The Fire Ministries") clearly demonstrates the risk that religious hate speech 
laws may encourage conflict between opposing religious groups. The case involved a 
complaint by the Islamic Council of Victoria regarding statements made by the third 
defendant, Pastor Scot, at a seminar presented by Catch the Fire Ministries. The 
Pastor's main role was to speak at seminars, educating groups of Christians on 
important issues. In the seminar at the centre of the dispute Pastor Scot had been 
speaking on the Muslim faith based upon extensive personal study of the Koran. His 
stated purpose was "to explain to Christian people certain aspects of Islamic teaching 
and to encourage and equip Christian believers to share their faith with Muslims." 152 
In other words, the Pastor was attempting to encourage other Christians to practice 
proselytism towards Muslims by exposing what he perceived as the folly of the 
Islamic faith. 
The Court was presented with a tape recording of the seminar. The Islamic 
Council alleged that many of the references in the recording had the effect of inciting 
hatred against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of the Islamic 
faith, in contravention of section 8 of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 
151 Catch The Fire Ministries Inc. v Islamic Council of Victoria (2006) VSCA 284. 
152 Ibid, para 90. 
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(Vic). 153 The Court highlighted some examples of the statements made by Pastor 
Scot. Some of these examples included: 154 
(I) That the Qur'an promotes violence and killing, destroying other people for the 
good of Muslim people; 
(2) That the Qur'an teaches that women are of little value, e.g. a woman is like a 
field to plough, use her as you wish; 
(3) People study for six to seven years to become true Muslims. And we call them 
terrorists, but they are true Muslim; they have read the Qur'an, they have 
understood it and now they are practising it, that is the connection between the 
Qur'an and terrorism; 
(4) Muslims intend to take over Australia and declare it an Islamic nation; and, 
(5) Muslims are demons. 
Nettle JA considered these statements in light of the section 11 defence, 
which applied to conduct undertaken reasonably and in good faith "in the course of 
any statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held, or any other conduct 
engaged in for any genuine academic, artistic, religious or scientific purpose."' 55 
Nettle JA opined that proselytism plainly fell within the scope of "religious 
purpose". 156 His Honour accepted that there was room for differences in religious 
opinion which must be tolerated in a just multicultural society. Criticism by the 
adherents of one religion of the tenets of another, even where such criticism appeared 
ill-informed, misconceived, ignorant or hurtful should be tolerated. 157 However, His 
Honour held that there must necessarily be a point where such speech becomes so 
unreasonable that it goes beyond the bounds of what tolerance should 
accommodate. 158 Furthermore, the statements made by Pastor Scot crossed the line 
of reasonableness. The Seminar was not a balanced discussion. Pastor Scot had taken 
153 Ibid , para 4. 
154 Ibid , para 25. 
155 
Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic), s l l(l)(b); Catch The Fire Ministries Inc. v Islamic 
Council of Victoria, above n 151 , para 82 ( emphasis added). 
156 Catch The Fire Ministries In c. v Islamic Council of Victoria, above n 151 , para 90. 
157 Ibid , para 94. 
158 Ibid , para 94. 
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literal translations from the Qur'an, and made no allowance for their applicability to 
modem day society. Consequently, the ordinary, reasonable reader would feel incited 
to hatred towards, or serious contempt for, or serious ridicule of a Muslim adherent 
on the ground of their re! igion. 159 
Nettle JA concluded his judgment by commenting upon the balance between 
free speech and hate censorship, which served to promote tolerance within society. 
His Honour stated: 160 
In my view one is entitled to assume that a fair and just multicultural society is a 
moderately intelligent society. Its members allow for the possibility that others 
may be right. Equally, I think, one is entitled to assume that it is a tolerant society. 
Its members acknowledge that what appears to some as ignorant, misguided or 
bigoted may sometimes appear to others as inspired. Above all, however, one is 
entitled to assume that it is a free society and so, therefore, one which insists upon 
the right of each of its members to seek to persuade others to his or her point of 
view, even if it is anathema to them. But of course there are limits. Tolerance cuts 
both ways. Members of a tolerant society are as much entitled to expect tolerance 
as they are bound to extend it to each other. And, in the scheme of human affairs, 
tolerance can extend each way only so far. 
Unfortunately, despite the good intention of Nettle JA to impose a limit upon speech 
which would serve to maximise respect and tolerance in society, what resulted was 
far from the balance carefully articulated in his judgment. 
As a member of the Muslim community, one minority group in particular 
which religious anti-vilification laws purport to protect, Amir Butler understandably 
supported the introduction of the 2001 legislation. However, his experience as the 
executive director of the Australian Muslim Public Affairs Committee, following the 
judgment against Catch the Fire Ministries, has caused him to change his mind. 161 
Butler claims that at every major Islamic lecture he has attended since the litigation 
small groups of Christians have also been in attendance, taking note of any content 
that may serve as evidence in future litigation. Although none of the Islamic 
159 Ibid, para 98. 
160 Ibid, para I 00. 
161 Butler,aboven 147, I. 
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organisations at the centre of this campaign by evangelical Christians were invol
ved 
in the Islamic Council litigation, these organisations "now suffer the consequence
s of 
having their publications and public utterances subjected to a ridiculous leve
l of 
· d l · ,, I 62 scrutmy an ana ys1s. 
Clearly, some members of the Christian community have not adopted the 
message of tolerance promoted by Nettle JA. Rather the judgment in Catch The Fir
e 
Ministries appears to have opened the door to the possibility of vexatious lega
l 
actions motivated by revenge. Far from the ideal of promoting equality and tolera
nce 
of religious groups, the Victorian experience has shown that the major achievem
ent 
of religious anti-vilification laws has been to "provide a legalistic weapon by wh
ich 
religious groups can silence their ideological opponents, rather than engaging
 in 
debate and discussion."
163 
As the next section shows, the experience in Victoria was taken into account 
in the United Kingdom and influenced the structure of the religious hatred provis
ion 
in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK). 
VIII THE PATH TO THE RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS HATRED ACT 200
6 
(UK) 
Upon ratifying the ICCPR, both New Zealand and the United Kingdom had 
already fulfilled their obligations under the CERD by implementing dome
stic 
legislation to prohibit incitement to racial hatred.
164 Consequently, both countries 
made a reservation to Article 20.2 of ICCPR, stating that the provision should ref
lect 
no more than the law as it stood at the time of ratification.
165 The New Zealand 
reservation was stated in the following terms: 
166 
162 Ibid. 
Having legislated in the areas of advocacy of national and racial hatred and 
the 
exciting of hostility or ill will against any group of persons, and having regard
 to 
163 Ibid , 2. 
164 The United Kingdom ratified the ICCPR in 1976, whereas New Zealand ratified
 the Convention in 
1978; New Zealand Human Rights Commission, above n 20 para 2.4. 
165 See generally, House of Lords Select Committee, above n 74, para 96. 
166 New Zealand Human Rights Commission, above n 20, para 2.4. 
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the right to freedom of speech, reserves the right not to introduce further 
legislation with regard to Art.20. 
A The Increasing Threat to the Muslim Community 
The United Kingdom reservation against extending existing protections 
outside of the racial sphere was reaffirmed by the UK Law Commission in its 1981 
working paper which recommended the abolition of blasphemy laws and deemed it 
inappropriate to introduce an offence of incitement to religious hatred to fill the gap. 
After accepting that public manifestations of racial hatred had obliged the law to 
intervene in the form of racial hatred legislation, the UK Law Commission went on to 
state: 167 
But similar problems seem for the most part to have been avoided in the context of 
religion ... [T]he most important reason is that differences of religion impinge far 
less on the public eye: although it is possible that the position may change in the 
future , the practice of a particular faith is, save where religion and politics are 
inextricably mixed, a private matter giving rise to few opportunities for public 
friction. 
The UK Law Commission went on to warn that the creation of an offence in 
the absence of a clearly demonstrable need could draw attention to the prohibited 
conduct and ultimately provoke "unlooked-for trouble." 168 A law which abridges 
freedom of speech where there is little social need, particularly a law which does so 
through the imposition of criminal sanction, risks being labelled as discriminatory. 
This could lead to widespread flouting of the law by those attempting to draw 
attention to its discriminatory nature or wishing to appear as martyrs in the name of 
freedom of expression. Ultimately, the law would fall into disrepute due to the 
impossibility of securing its proper enforcement. 169 
Twenty-four years after these comments were made by the UK Law 
Commission, the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill 2005 (UK) was introduced in the 
House of Commons, which proposed that the existing incitement to racial hatred 
167 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79, above n 6, para 7.20. 
168 Ibid, para 8.5. 
169 lbid , para 7.17. 
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offence in the Public Order Act 1986 (UK) be extended to include incitement to 
hatred on the grounds of religion. 
In 2001, the United Nations Human Rights Committee ("UNHRC"), after 
examining the degree of compliance of State parties which had ratified the ICCPR, 
recommended that the reservation entered by the United Kingdom be withdrawn.
170 
The UNHRC expressed concerns that following recent terrorist attacks people had 
been the subject of attack and harassment on the basis of their religious beliefs and 
that religion had been utilized to incite the commission of criminal acts.
171 The 
UNHRC made the following recommendation: 
172 
The State party should extend its criminal legislation to cover offences motivated 
by religious hatred and should take other steps to ensure that all persons are 
protected from discrimination on account of their religious beliefs. 
It is only after accounting for the growing hostility in the United Kingdom 
directed towards members of the Muslim community in response to an increasing 
terrorist threat both domestically and internationally that one begins to understand the 
dramatic tum in Government support for a religious hate speech law. The reservation 
of the Home Secretary, in 1965, against extending racial hate speech protection to 
religious groups was expressly made against a social climate where there was no 
evidence of any significant attempts to stir up hatred on the grounds of religion. 
173 
Numerous examples can be found to demonstrate that concerns regarding 
discrimination directed towards the Muslim community were a major driving force 
surrounding the enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK).
174 
Likewise, the Victorian Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) was 
also enacted against a background of an escalating threat towards the Muslim 
community. In 2004, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
170 United Nations Human Rights Committee, 73
rd session, CCPR/C0/73/UK;CCPR/C0/73/UKOT 6 
December 2001 . 
171 Ibid. 
172 Jbid. 
173 House of Commons, above n 142, col 83. 
174 See generally, House of Lords Select Committee, above n 74, para 11, where the Select Committee 
stated: "Today, it is the Muslim community which feels itself the least protected from hatred and most 
exposed to hostile attack, both verbal and physical." 
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Commission issued a report detailing continuing acts of discrimination and outright 
violence towards the Muslim community in Australia following the September 11 
terrorist attacks in America. 175 However, it is also apparent that religious hatred 
legislation is intended to cut both ways, protecting the Muslim community from 
discrimination on the one hand and providing a legalistic weapon for silencing 
scathing attacks upon other religions launched by fundamentalist preachers on the 
other. 176 
B Closing a Loophole 
Another important factor underlining the need for new legislation, was a 
perceived loophole, whereby ethno-religious groups such as Jews and Sikhs were 
protected as racial groups under existing racial hatred laws, yet Muslim communities 
whilst the focus of growing hostility, could not point to racial foundations and were 
left unprotected. 177 During a debate of the House of Lords, Lord Lester addressed the 
demands from the Muslim community for the introduction of legislation to close the 
perceived gap. His Lordship rejected the proposition that Jews and Sikhs were 
afforded greater protection under the law than Muslims. Attacks upon Jews and 
Sikhs on the basis of their religious beliefs would equally fall outside of the ambit of 
the law. Whereas, if an attack upon a Muslim group was truly directed towards their 
Asian ethnicity, they would be protected under the racial hatred provisions. 178 
The application of this distinction in reality, however, was not as simple as 
perceived by Lord Lester. For example, although members of the British National 
Party would make frequent comments, which were undoubtedly racist, they managed 
to successfully use the loophole in the racial hatred provisions to sidestep convictions 
for inciting racial hatred. 179 In 2006, whilst the Religious and Racial Hatred Bill was 
still being debated, Nick Griffin, the leader of the British National Party, was 
175 Centre for Cultural Research Report to The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission: The 
Experience And Reporting By Arab And Muslim Australians Of Discrimination, Abuse And Violence 
Since I I September 2001 (Sydney, 2004). 
176 Adhar, above n 22, 381. 
177 Tim Kevan "Hate Laws Under Scrutiny" (2006) 156 NLJ 1857, 1857. 
178 
( 11 October 2005) 450 I-ILD col 174. 
179 Dawn Watkins "A State of Uncertainty" (2006) 156 NLJ 660,661. 
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acquitted of all charges which had been bought against him under the existing racial 
hatred provisions. 180 At his trial Griffin testified that: 
181 
His distaste was not for Asians but for Islam, which he considered to be a wicked 
and vicious faith. He added 'When I criticise Islam, I criticise that religion and the 
culture that it sets up, certainly not Muslims as a group and most definitely not 
Asians.' 
Griffin was acquitted despite that fact that footage covertly filmed by an undercover 
journalist was available, which confirmed that he had advised his supporters that it 
was necessary to focus their attacks upon religion rather than race to avoid 
· 182 prosecution. 
C The House of Lords Free Speech Amendments 
When the original Racial and Religious Hatred Bill was introduced m the 
House of Commons, the Government was proposing to amend the Public Order Act 
1986 (UK) by simply adding religion to the existing offence of inciting racial 
hatred. 183 Significantly, unlike its predecessor in the Public Order Act 1936 (UK), 
the existing offence of incitement to racial hatred in section 18(1) of the 1986 Act 
does not require that the speaker intended to stir up hatred. Consequently, it 
represents a particularly intrusive limitation on free speech. Section 18(1) states:
184 
A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or 
displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of 
an offence if-
(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or; 
(b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up 
thereby. 
180 Ibid, 667. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid , 664. 
184 Public Order Act 1986 (UK), s 18( I) . 
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The House of Lords aggressively opposed the original form of the Bill due to 
concerns that it was overly broad and vague and would likely have a chilling effect 
on legitimate speech. 185 It is clear that the House of Lords took heed of the warnings 
from the unexpected impact of religious hate speech laws in Victoria. Baroness Cox 
specifically noted the conflict and tension that has arisen between religious groups in 
Victoria. 186 As a consequence, a large majority of the House of Lords voted in favour 
of significant amendments to the Bill. The most notable proposals were as follows: 187 
i. The words abusive or insulting were to be removed from the Bill, leaving 
only threatening words or behaviour as the basis for the offence; 
ii. The crime was to be limited to those who possess the requisite intent; 
iii. A freedom of expression clause was included in order to protect any 
discussion, criticism and even ridicule of a particular religion from 
the effect of the Bill; 
The Government was subsequently defeated in the House of Commons as all 
three of these amendments were favoured by a majority in the Commons. 188 The final 
religious hatred provision in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK) only 
outlaws the use of threatening words or behaviour which are used with the intent of 
inciting hatred towards a religious group. This reflects the recognition of the House of 
Lords that race and religion are different in kind and that the wide protections from 
insult and abuse afforded to ethnic groups could not be legitimately extended to 
religious groups. Significantly, section 291 of the Act contains a broadly worded 
protection of free speech, aimed at preventing a general chilling of legitimate 
criticism ofreligion: 189 
Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or 
restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or 
abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any 
other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or 
185 See for example, (25 October 2005) 450 HLD col I 074; Olivia, above n 48, 82. 
186 
( II October 2005) 450 HLD col 199. 
187 Dawn Watkins "Racial And Religious Hatred Versus Free Speech" (2005) 18 NLJ 1730, 1737. 
188 Olivia, above n 48, 82. 
189 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK), s 29J . 
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urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their 
religion or belief system. 
The result of these amendments is that the new incitement to religious hatred 
law is a much diluted version of the original Bill. 190 Some commentators question 
whether the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK) will provide any significant 
impetus for social change in the United Kingdom. 191 The impact of the new religious 
hatred provisions will likely be restricted to the extremists who set out with the sole 
intention of encouraging others to hate identifiable religious groups. It would be hard 
to argue that the speech of these fringe haters should be afforded any protection 
under the law. However, some people question whether criminalising those on the 
fringes of reality is the most appropriate response. It will be necessary to attempt to 
answer this question in due course, as the discussion now moves on to consider 
whether New Zealand should follow a similar legislative path to the United 
Kingdom. 
IX RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand born academic, Rex Ahdar, has written extensively on the 
relationship between religion and the law. In his writing, Adhar has examined the 
state of religious liberty in numerous countries around the world. In 2004, Ahdar 
turned the spotlight on New Zealand: 192 
If a typical rugby-loving, suburban-dwelling New Zea lander was asked by a pushy 
social scientist or pollster to take an annoying word association test, his or her 
response to the word ' religion ' might be a muffled yawn accompanied by an 
answer such as ' irrelevant,' 'boring,' or 'outdated .' . . . In one sense, the 
widespread cultural disinterest in organized religion that typifies much of our 
history may be viewed as a positive thing. It can hardly be a cause for regret that, 
by and large, ew Zealand has not witnessed the large-scale, bitter religious 
turmoil that has beset many nations . 
190 Olivia, above n 48, 83 . 
191 Watkins, above n 179, 662. 
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In the same year the New Zealand Human Rights Commission issued 
a report assessing New Zealand's perfonnance in protecting human rights. 193 
The conclusion in regard to the state of religious liberty was positive: "By 
world standards, New Zealand is very tolerant ofreligious diversity within the 
context of a secular State." 194 
These passages underline a clear contrast between the social climates in New 
Zealand and both the United Kingdom and Australia respectively, where the 
treatment of the Muslim community has obliged legislative intervention. Although it 
would be misleading to claim that the Muslim community in New Zealand has been 
altogether immune from public backlash in response to the actions of extremist 
terrorist groups in recent years. Many people will recall the shameful desecration of 
six Auckland mosques as an immediate response to the 2005 London bombings, 
which took the lives of more than 50 people. 195 However, since this incident, which 
was the first attack on the Muslim community in New Zealand to catch the attention 
of the nation, 196 there has been little indication that Muslims are being subject to 
public hostility or ill-will. In contrast to the United Kingdom and Australia, there 
were no reprisals against the Muslim community in New Zealand following the arrest 
in 2007 of eight Middle Eastern and Indian doctors in connection with unsuccessful 
bombing attempts in London and Glasgow. Javed Khan, president of the Federation 
of Islamic Associations of New Zealand noted that whilst he had heard reports that 
some Muslim doctors living in New Zealand were understandably uncomfortable in 
the wake of the attacks, media campaigns had successfully dispelled any beliefs of a 
connection with the New Zealand Muslim community. Mr Khan commented 
further: 197 
I think New Zealand has always been a lot more open-minded about these things 
and a lot more wise in how we react. .. Our community here is a bit different from 
America and Britain, they feel much more comfortable here. 
193 New Zealand Human Rights Commission Human Rights in New Zealand Today (I September 
2004). 
194 Ibid, 28. 
195 See generally, "Six Auckland Mosques Vandalised" (I I July 2005) www.tvnz.co.nz (accessed 20 
August 2007). 
196 Ibid. 
197 Rebecca Todd "Muslim Doctors in ew Zealand Uncomfortable" (9 July 2007) The Press 
Auckland www.stuff.co.nz (accessed 3 August 2007). 
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Likewise, there was a swell of public outrage following the mindless 
destruction of a number of Jewish cemeteries in Wellington in 2004.
198 David Zwartz, 
president of the New Zealand Jewish Council publicly acknowledged the gratitude of 
the Jewish community for the "offers of suppo11 [that] had flooded in to the 
community."
199 In addition, a poster campaign by the Jewish Student Union at 
Auckland University calling for all New Zealander's to reject racial and religious 
hatred was well received by the public.
200 
The response of the New Zealand public to these isolated outbursts of hostility 
towards religious minorities demonstrates that in New Zealand ' s prevailing social 
climate, the counter-speech of the majority is a valuable tool for denouncing the 
deplorable behaviour of a few individuals. The failure of the fringe haters to gain any 
recognisable traction with the public of New Zealand raises serious concerns for the 
introduction of religious hate speech legislation. As Butler argues, "social pressure is 
a far more effective mechanism for controlling such speech than law suits."
20 1 Given 
the apparent lack of a pressing social need, the next sub-section examines whether 
religious hate speech legislation in New Zealand could stand up to the justified 
limitation test in section 5 of the NZBORA. 
A A Justified Limitation? 
In Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd, the High Court stated that 
freedom of expression "guarantees everyone [the right] to express their thoughts, 
opinions and beliefs however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the general opinion 
or to the particular opinion of others in the community. "
202 However, this statement 
must be read in light of section 5 of the NZBORA, which confirms that no rights are 
absolute. Even freedom of expression, the fundamental pillar of democracy, can be 
restricted in limited circumstances. 
198 Nicola Boyes "Worldwide Di smay at Attacks on Graves" (9 August 2004) www.nzherald .co.n
z 
(accessed 9 Jul y 2007). 
199 Ibid . 
200 Ibid . 
20 1 Butler, above n 145. 
202 Solicitor-Genera/ v Radio New Zealand Ltd [ 1994] 1 NZLR 48, 59. 
The New Zealand courts have largely adopted the approach of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R v Oakes2°3 ("Oakes") as a guide to determining whether a limit 
on a right is justifiable under section 5. 204 There are two broad limbs to the Oakes 
test. First, the limiting measure must serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the right. Once the objective has been established as sufficiently 
important, the means adopted to further that objective must meet the test of 
proportionality. This requires the examination of three further elements. First, the 
limiting measure must be rationally connected with its purpose. Second, the limiting 
measure must impair the relevant right as little as possible. Finally, the limit must be 
in due proportion to the objective.205 
The Canadian courts have had a number of opportunities to examme the 
justifiability of Canadian hate speech legislation in regard to the guarantee of freedom 
of expression in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 206 The 
Canadian courts have had little difficulty in recognising that hate speech legislation 
pursues the sufficiently important objectives of promoting equality and preventing 
real harm to minority groups. 207 Likewise, the Canadian courts have had no problem 
identifying that the prohibition of hate speech is rationally connected to the objective 
of preventing discrimination of targeted groups. 208 However, some commentators 
question whether prohibiting hate speech is an effective means of achieving this 
objective. It is argued that the prosecution of hate mongers generates a huge amount 
of media attention thereby airing the hateful message to a much wider audience than 
otherwise possible. Whereas the hate monger may have otherwise been ignored on 
the fringes ofreality they become a martyr for their cause.209 
In R v Keegstra , Dickson CJ rejects this argument on the basis that a criminal 
trial is also a form of expression, which sends a message to the public that hate 
propaganda will not be tolerated and highlights the value of equality in a democratic 
203 R v Oakes [ 1986] I SCR I 03. 
204 See generally, R v Hansen, [2007] NZSC 7. 
205 Ibid, para 43 . 
206 See generally, Citron v Zundel [2004] 4 l CHRR D/274; Canada v Tay lor [ 1990] 3 SCR 892; R v 
Keegstra, above n 125 . 
207 See generally, Citron v Zundel, above n 206, para 234; Canada v Tay lor, above n 206, para 140; R v 
Keegstra , above n 125, para 85. 
208 R v Keegstra, above n 125, para l 02. 
209 See generally, Butler, above n 147, 2. 
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society.21° From New Zealand's perspective, the argument also ignores the fact that 
all of the isolated incidents of religious hatred surveyed above
211 were outwardly 
public events and it is likely that any similar incidents in the future will also catch the 
attention of the nation given its small population size. Prosecuting the hate mongers 
in this situation would not afford them a larger stage from which to air there message. 
Rather, as conceptualised by Dickson CJ, the State would send a message to the 
public of its condemnation of hate propaganda. 
The more senous difficulty for religious hate speech proponents in New 
Zealand will be demonstrating that the limitation impinges on free speech as little as 
possible and is in due proportion to the objective to be achieved. The first difficulty is 
posed by the recognition that society in New Zealand is uniquely tolerant of religious 
differences. It appears that public counter-speech which condemns incidents of 
religious bigotry is at present an effective mechanism for suppressing discrimination 
towards religious groups. The marketplace of ideas is living up to its ideal in New 
Zealand; the best ideas are winning out. Enacting legislative measures which impinge 
upon free speech can hardly be justified as the least intrusive means of securing 
religious equality when free speech is already an effective solution. 
On the other hand, accepting that the messages of the fringe hate mongers are 
not worthy of any protection under the banner of free speech, one may argue that the 
combination of public counter-speech and criminal prosecution would be an even 
more effective mechanism for deteITing hate propaganda. One may further suggest 
that although vilification of religious groups is not cuITently a social problem in New 
Zealand, there is no hann in enacting legislation as a safeguard for the future. These 
arguments are seriously flawed for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, adopting this path would ignore the fact that in order to meet the test 
of proportionality, the benefits gained through the introduction of a measure limiting 
free speech must be sufficient to outweigh the infringement of the right.
21 2 In 
Keegstra, Dickson CJ stated this principle in the following terms: "[O]ne must ask 
?JO - Keegstra , above n 125, para 105. 
211 See Part IX Religious Tolerance in New Zealand. 
2 12 See generally, Canada v Tay lor, above n 206, para 141 McLachlin J. 
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whether the amount of hate propaganda in Canada causes sufficient harm to justify 
legislative intervention of some type."2 13 Meeting this test would be a very difficult 
task in New Zealand given the absence of the harm which religious hate speech 
legislation seeks to remedy. The underwhelming impact of the legislation would also 
have to be weighed against the chilling effect it may have on legitimate debate and 
criticism ofreligion. 
More importantly, however, the argument ignores the impact which hate 
speech legislation may have, above and beyond punishing the fringe hate mongers. 
As demonstrated by the fallout between opposing religious groups in Victoria 
following the Catch The Fire Ministries litigation, hate speech legislation can serve 
as a means of undermining religious liberty. Of course, in light of the preceding 
discussion, one could be forgiven for arguing that there is little risk that religious 
groups will suddenly tum on each other given the traditional tolerance of religion in 
New Zealand. However, there is good reason to question this assertion. 
Professor Anthony Wood suggests that the remarkable tolerance that has 
traditionally been extended to non-Christian faiths in New Zealand is largely due to 
"the overwhelming, unchallenged Christian composition of the population."214 
However, Rex Ahdar observes that this may be set to change as the disestablishment 
of Christianity as the de facto State religion continues to push New Zealand towards a 
more heterogeneous society. As a result of the disestablishment, Ahdar warns that 
New Zealand may observe an increase of religious freedom claims from minority 
religions in the future. 2 15 Potentially, as observed in Victoria, the provision of hate 
speech legislation may be perceived by religious minorities as a means of competing 
with their ideological opponents and could ultimately serve as the precipitating event 
that forges religious divisions. Indeed, support for this hypothesis can be found in the 
following observation by Stephen Braun: 
2 13 R v Keegstra , above n 125, para 63. 
214 John Stenhouse (ed) Christianity, Modernity and Culture: New Perspectives on New Zealand 
Histo,y (ATF Press, Auckland, 2005) 229; cited in, Rex J. Adhar " Reflections on the Path of Religion-
State Relations In New Zealand" (2006) BYU L Rev 619, 657. 
2 15 Adhar, above n 214, 658 . 
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In a stable, multicultural democracy such as Canada, the more pressing social 
divisions are more likely to be rooted in the just causes and the multifaceted 
internecine squabbles of rival minority groups competing for political ascendancy 
than in the simplistic untruths of transparent, fringe racists. 
It would certainly be ironic if a law introduced as a harmless safety 
mechanism to combat potential hate mongers in the future, was in the meantime to 
serve as a legal tool to undermine religious liberty. 
With these objections in mind one can now begin to understand the cautious 
legislative pathway in the United Kingdom, proceeding from an early reservation to 
extending existing racial hatred provisions to religious groups, to the enactment of the 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK). It is clear from the debates preceding the 
introduction of the Act that account was taken of the differences between race and 
religion. The risk that the proposed legislation would chill genuine debate and 
criticism of religion was clearly acknowledged as was the threat to religious liberty. 
However, the point came where the degree of religious hate propaganda in the United 
Kingdom had reached a level where it posed a real and substantial threat to the 
equality of religious groups. It is only after this point was reached that the potential 
benefits to be secured through the introduction of religious hate speech laws could 
safely outweigh the competing potential harm. Unless religious intolerance in New 
Zealand society reaches a similar level, the potential harms threatened by the 
introduction of a religious hate speech prohibition are sufficient to outweigh the 
potential benefits. 
The question that remains to be answered is whether or not the legislative 
measures adopted in the United Kingdom go far enough in addressing the potential 
harms of hate propaganda, and, if not, what could New Zealand learn for the future, if 
a legislative prohibition of religious hate speech does become a necessary measure? 
50 
X ADDRESSING THE FUTURE: CONSTRUCTING A JUSTIFIABLE 
RELIGIOUS HATE SPEECH PROVISION FOR NEW ZEALAND 
A Insult and Abuse 
The two most notable aspects of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
(UK) are first, only threatening words used with the intent of stirring up hatred 
against an identifiable religious group are prohibited,216 and second, there is a broad 
protection of free speech, which excludes an array of speech from the ambit of the 
criminal law.217 Some examples of protected speech include words that are abusive 
and insulting toward religion, and words used for the purpose of proselytising. 
Whilst the United Kingdom provision is praiseworthy in that it goes a long 
way to ensure that only the genuine fringe haters are criminalised, it is likely that its 
restricted nature will fail to address much of the true harm caused by religious hate 
propaganda. From a public order perspective, silencing threatening words may help 
religious minorities to feel less vulnerable to violent acts. However, in both the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand it is already a crime to make threats of 
violence. 218 Merely extending this existing protection to target hate mongers, who 
use their threatening words to incite others to hatred of religious minorities, 
represents a very narrow band of additional liability.219 
A better balance could be stuck by including insult and abuse under the 
prohibited grounds of speech. Any genuine comment on religion that may fall under 
these bands of liability would generally be filtered out by the requirement that the 
speaker intended to stir up hatred. If full weight is given to the terms hatred and 
intent, it is unlikely, for example, that a comedian who pokes fun at religion, or a 
concerned member of the public who aggressively criticises a questionable religious 
practice, will be criminalised for intending to stir-up hatred. In reality, it will be clear 
216 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2001 (UK), s 298. 
217 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2001 (UK), s 291. 
218 Public Order Act 1986 (UK), s 4(1 )(a); Crimes Act I 961, s 2, The definition of assault states, 
"Assault means ... threatening by any act or gesture to app ly such force to the person of another, if the 
person making the threat has, or causes the other to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present 
ability to effect his purpose." 
219 See generally, Ian Bassett " ls Hate Speech Legislation Necessary or Desirable?" 
www.hatespeech.co.nz (accessed 28 July 2007) 2. 
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from the context in the vast majority of cases whether or not words are spoken with 
an underlying intent to stir-up hatred. 
B Proselytism 
A more difficult issue concerns the degree of protection that should be 
afforded to proselytism to prevent religious hate speech laws triggering conflict 
between religious groups. There is no doubt that following the decision in Catch The 
Fire Ministries in Victoria, the explicit recognition by Muslim leaders of the threat of 
prosecution from opposing Christian groups will filter down through the lower 
echelons of the religion. It is here that the 'invisible' effects of the Catch The Fire 
Ministries case take hold, acting to suppress what may be legitimate proselytism, for 
fear of legal retaliation. 
The concern to prevent a chilling of legitimate proselytism, however, must be 
considered in light of the recognition in the United Kingdom that the introduction of 
religious hate speech legislation was necessary not only to protect religious groups 
from discrimination, but also to combat fundamentalist religious preachers 
responsible for stirring up hatred towards opposing religious groups.
220 Thus, it is 
important to acknowledge that religious liberty can not be used as a shield from 
beneath which religious fundamentalists can direct any comments towards other 
religious groups, no matter how hateful. In this sense, it is arguable that the decision 
in Catch the Fire Ministries strikes an appropriate balance between freedom of 
speech and religious liberty, despite the religious conflict that later ensued. 
One could be excused for defending the comments of Pastor Scot, which 
attacked some of the controversial practices of Islam. Indeed, members of the 
United Kingdom Joint Committee on Human Rights were minded to protect this very 
freedom in the debates surrounding the introduction of the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006 (UK). For example, Baroness Turner of Camden was concerned to 
protect speech critical of Islam on the basis that Islamic fundamentalists are often 
comfortable to suppress woman's rights in the name of religion.
221 However, it is 
difficult to suggest that the Pastor's additional comments, which suggested that 
220 See Pai1 Vil A The Increasing Threat to The Muslim Community. 
221 
( I I Oct 2005) 450 HLD col 202. 
52 
Muslims are demons who are trying to take over Australia, served any other purpose 
but to incite the audience towards hatred of Muslims.222 
If Pastor Scot's seminar had have been an isolated incident of religious 
hatred, the potential benefits arising from the introduction of the Racial and Religious 
Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) would most likely have been overshadowed by the ensuing 
conflict between opposing religious groups. However, as highlighted above, this was 
not an isolated incident in Australia. 223 Legislators in Victoria were faced with an 
environment of escalating harassment of Muslim groups, which in many instances 
had culminated in violent assaults. The potential benefits of a law promoting 
religious equality were clearly capable of outweighing the potential harms. 
C Consent of the Attorney-General 
Any future religious hate speech legislation in New Zealand should impose 
the requirement of leave from the Attorney-General before a prosecution can be 
bought. This is the position provided for in the United Kingdom under section 29L of 
the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK). In the United Kingdom the 
requirement for the Attorney-General's consent was described by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Religious Offences as "essential in order to exclude vexatious 
cases."224 However, there are limits to how far this requirement can protect genuine 
free speech. Regrettably, the mere threat that religious groups will utilise new found 
legal avenues to silence their opponents may be sufficient to chill some instances of 
legitimate debate and criticism of religion. 
D A Cause for Concern 
Some commentators fear that hate censorship cannot be politically confined 
within stable limits such that the intrusiveness of the censorship will continue to 
increase over time.225 This slippery slope argument against hate censorship arises 
from a fear that once censorship of one form of hateful speech gains legitimacy, 
protections may be extended to other groups not currently considered protected 
222 See Pa1i VIII B The Victorian Example. 
223 See Part VIII A The Increasing Threat to Th e Muslim Community. 
224 House of Lords Select Committee, above n 74, para I 09. 
225 See generally, Stephan Braun Democracy Off Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate 
Propaganda law in Canada (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2004) 121-135. 
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minorities, for example ove1weight people or people of lower socioeconomic 
class. 226 However, even more wonying in this context are the parallels between 
religious and political beliefs. Both religious and political beliefs are merely sets of 
ideologies that must be free to compete in the marketplace of ideas. And, similar to 
religion, political confrontation is capable of fuelling intense emotion. However, 
nobody would question that the right to publicly attack political beliefs is anything 
other than a fundamental benchmark of a functional democracy. 
Recall that the UK Law Commission rejected 'protection of public order' as 
an unsound basis for the retention of blasphemy law. 227 The Commission opined that 
to justify an offence penalising attacks on religion that may lead to a breach of peace, 
it would have to be demonstrated that there is a greater danger from this type of 
publication than the publication of extremist political material. 22 8 Implicit in this 
passage is the notion that political speech is necessarily subject to an absolute 
protection from state interference. 229 Yet, it is difficult to see how hateful attacks 
directed towards religious adherents are any more damaging to the believer than 
hateful attacks on the basis of political beliefs. If this is so, then perhaps in the midst 
of the calming quiet resulting from religious hate censorship, legislators may be 
motivated to extend similar protections into the political sphere. The defence of this 
censorship would read similar to the United Kingdom Home Secretary's defence of 
religious hate speech legislation.230 That is, genuine political debate and criticism 
would not be under threat, only threatening and abusive attacks capable of stining up 
hatred. 
On the surface, the argument that hate censorship represents a slippery slope 
that may ultimately lead to the censorship of political speech is a cause for concern. 
The argument becomes less persuasive when it is considered that political speech is 
generally regarded as the highest echelon of speech worthy of protection.231 The 
226 Ibid , 179. 
227 See Part IV A 4 Protection of public order. 
228 United Kingdom Law Commission Working Paper No. 79, above n 6, para 7.23. 
229 
Ibid, para 7.16, where the UK Law Commission notes that the most fervent of political beliefs may 
be subject to any kind of attack without interference from the law save in matters of public order, 
obscenity and defamation of character. 
230 See Part Vil A Race and Religion are Different in Kind. 
231 Bardent, above n I, 37 . 
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judgement of the ECtHR in Wingrove v United Kingdom is particularly instructive. 
Although the ECtHR was prepared to extend a margin of appreciation to State parties 
which operated blasphemy laws, thus restricting freedom of expression to protect 
religious sensibilities, the ECtHR was explicit that the same margin was not 
available in regard to political speech.232 
XI CONCLUSION 
Although New Zealand's track record of religious tolerance is not 
unblemished, the New Zealand Parliament should be proud of the nation for its 
comparatively praiseworthy track record of religious tolerance. Although it is 
unfortunate that the expression of some members of society sometimes deeply 
offends the beliefs of religious minorities, penalising instances of such expression by 
recourse to the criminal law of blasphemy imposes an intolerable burden upon 
freedom of speech. The law is not a legal irrelevance in New Zealand simply because 
it has largely laid dormant for the length of its statutory existence. 
Today it is unclear whether the law is an artist's foe by chilling instances of 
genuine expression, or an artist ' s friend by prompting lucrative controversy. What is 
clear, however, is that blasphemy law is discriminatory and sends a signal to society 
of the pre-eminence of Christianity over all other religions. The notion that only 
Christian groups are afforded a legal protection from offence is inconsistent with the 
fact that there has never been a legally established Church in New Zealand and as a 
modem democracy which prides itself on principles of equality, the abolition of the 
law of blasphemy is necessary to signal the equality of all religions under the law. 
Religious hate speech laws pursue a much more valuable goal of preventing 
expression which may positively undermine the fundamental right of a believer to 
manifest their religion, or encourage others to discriminate against identifiable 
religious groups. Importantly, a hate vilification law would protect each religion 
equally. However, prohibiting religious hate speech comes with the potential social 
costs of preventing genuine debate and criticism of religion and undermining the 
liberty of the very religious groups the prohibition is designed to protect. 
232 See Part III D A Justifiable Limitation on Free Speech? Decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
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It is unfortunate that in some foreign jurisdictions, the potential harms 
threatened by the introduction of religious hate speech laws have been outweighed by 
the hope that the laws will alleviate the very real threat to religious minorities, posed 
by an escalating environment of religious intolerance. In contrast, the Parliament of 
New Zealand is by no means compelled to intervene by the prevailing social climate. 
Thus, if a religious hate speech law was introduced it would largely serve as a safety 
mechanism for the future. Such a move would be unwise in light of the potential 
banns that may ensue. The vast majority of the New Zealand public have 
demonstrated that they are capable of using their fundamental right to free speech 
responsibly, not simply by refusing to engage in hateful speech, but by using their 
speech as a weapon to combat sporadic incidences of religious hatred. In this way 
free speech is used to ensure that it is the haters that are marginalised on the fringes of 
reality, not the targets of their hatred. 
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